Acquaintance Rape & The  Force  Element: When  No  is Not Enough by Edwards, Daphne
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 2 Women's Law Forum Article 2
January 1996
Acquaintance Rape & The "Force" Element: When
"No" is Not Enough
Daphne Edwards
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daphne Edwards, Acquaintance Rape & The "Force" Element: When "No" is Not Enough, 26 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1996).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/2
COMMENT 
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE & THE "FORCE" 
ELEMENT: WHEN "NO" IS NOT ENOUGH 
It is widely accepted that most rapes are acquaintance 
rapes. l Prosecutors and law enforcement officials, however, 
have repeatedly testified it is almost "impossible to obtain" 
acquaintance rape convictions.2 As under the common law, 
1. Dana Berliner, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 
YALE L.J. 2687 n.1 (1991) (citing study which found 81 percent of rapes are ac-
quaintance rapes); TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 8-9 (Emilie Buchwald et al. 
eds., 1993) (citing a 1991 National Crime Victimization Survey Report conducted 
by the Department of Justice which found that 70 percent of rapes are committed 
by acquaintances); ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 14 (1988). A 1982 
study by Mary P. Koss conducted across the country involving 6,159 college stu-
dents from thirty-two schools found that 84 percent of the women raped knew 
their attackers. Id. at 11, 189-195. A study by Diana Russell of 930 women in San 
Francisco revealed of the 88 percent of the victims knew their attackers. Id. at 14. 
A 1986 Massachusetts Department of Public Health study found that two-thirds of 
the victims who contacted rape crisis centers knew their attackers. Id. The Ameri-
can Medical Association issued statistics in 1995 showing that 75 percent of all 
rapes are perpetrated by "a friend, acquaintance, intimate partner or family mem-
ber." Sexual Assault Called 'Silent Violent Epidemic,' WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 6, 
1995, at A03. 
The definition of acquaintance rape includes a broad range of relationships 
between the assailant and the victim. LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE 130-
131 (1995). The continuum of relationships between the two range from the victim 
barely knowing the assailant to the victim having an intimate relationship with 
the assailant. Id. The assailant may be a co-worker, neighbor, client, date or 
someone the victim met at a party or bar. LINDA E. LEDRAY, RECOVERING FROM 
RAPE 21-24 (1986). 
2. Amy McLellan, Post·Penetration Rape·Increasing the Penalty, 31 SANTA 
CLARA L. REv. 779, 783 (1991) (quoting a New York prosecutor who stated, 
in 1985, that it was almost impossible to prosecute date rape cases). One 
trial judge recently stated: 
It is almost impossible in this country to get a con-
viction of rape. [Ilnstead of trying the defen-
dant, you make the poor girl the defendant... 
241 
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inadequate legal definitions of rape continue to act as a prima-
ry barrier to convictions.3 
Today the element of "force" is one statutory barrier that 
is almost as great an obstacle to obtaining acquaintance rape 
convictions as the "old consent approach.'" Although the defi-
nition of the "force" element allows for broad application, overt 
physical force is often required because courts narrowly con-
strue the element.5 Narrow application of the "force" element, 
then, serves to perpetuate the myth that rape is accomplished 
by physical violence beyond unwanted penetration.6 The result 
is that the typical verbal coercion used in acquaintance rapes 
is not recognized as "forcible rape," but instead rationalized as 
legal "seduction."7 Thus, the victim may be sobbing, begging, 
or pleading with the assailant to stop, but the act will not be 
"rape" unless some kind of violence, such as kicking, choking, 
or hitting, has been used by the perpetrator to satisfy the 
"force" element.a 
[G]irls don't report rape for the humiliation in-
volved in it, the degradation they go through in 
trial . " They are made the defendant, and they 
walk out of this court with one thought on their 
mind: In our courts there is no justice for the vic-
tims of rape. And I can't say I disagree with them. 
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 415 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (dissent-
ing Judge Spaeth quoting another trial judge). The unlikelihood of convic-
tion in acquaintance rape cases leads many prosecutors to not even file a 
rape complaint. Barbara Fromm, Sexual Battery: Mixed Signal Legislation Re-
veals Need for Further Reform, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 599, 600 (1991). 
3. McLellan, supra note 2, at 783 (citing a New York prosecutor who 
stated that date rape prosecution was impossible because of state law, 
lack of public support, and the victim's reluctance to become involved). 
This comment will only address how the legal definition of rape hinders 
convictions. Public opinion is only addressed to illustrate how the law 
reinforces false notions of what the crime involves. 
4. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 71 (1987). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 69. 
7. Id.; WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 139. 
8. See Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Com-
monwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Mlinarich, 498 
A.2d 395; State v. Weisburg, 829 P.2d 252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Karen 
Kramer, Rule by Myth: The Social and Legal Dynamics Governing Alcohol-Related 
Acquaintance Rapes, 47 STAN. L. REV. 115, 141 (citing State v. Thomas, No. 
B9198729, Palo Alto Mun. Ct. Preliminary Examination, Nov. 13, 1991). 
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This comment will show that courts have construed the 
"force" element to exclude a broad range of coercive conduct.9 
This application perpetuates rape myths and enables assail-
ants to use a broad range of force without the act being legally 
recognized as "rape.'>lO 
Part I explains the development of rape jurisprudence to 
illustrate how the law has evolved to emphasize the "force" 
element. Part II examines rape myths that affect the courts' 
application of the "force" element. The purpose of this section 
is to dispel the "violent stranger" rape myth and to illustrate 
that the most typical "force" used by perpetrators is verbal 
coercion. Part III examines acquaintance rape cases where 
convictions were reversed due to insufficient "force." These 
cases illustrate the courts' inability to recognize verbal coercion 
as sufficient to satisfy the "force" element. The cases also show 
that when the victim says "no," the assailant's physical aggres-
sion against her, which overrides and ignores her verbal resis-
tance, is not viewed as sufficient "force."ll 
Part IV endorses and proposes Washington's third degree 
rape statute,12 which does not require the "force" element to 
9. See cases cited supra note 8. Each of these cases show courts nar-
rowly construe the 'force' element, excluding a broad range of coercive 
conduct. [d. 
10. See generally id. 
11. This comment does not address rape cases where overt physical 
violence beyond penetration is used. This choice is intentional. Cases in-
volving "strangers, weapons, and "positive violence" [stand] the highest 
chance of being believed." SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, 
WOMEN AND RAPE 366 (1975). On the other hand, in acquaintance rape cases 
where subtle force is used, the victim is more likely not to report the 
crime, the police are more likely to conclude that the complaint is un-
founded, prosecutors are more likely to dismiss the complaint, and juries 
are more likely to acquit. [d.; ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 8-9, 15; Patricia 
Lopez, He said . . . She said . . . An Overview of Date Rape From Commission 
Through Prosecution Through Verdict, 13 CRIM. JUST. J. 275 (1992). 
This comment also only addresses male on female rapes. Ninety per-
cent of all rape victims are female. Kramer, supra note 8, at 116 n.10. 
Thus, female pronouns will be used when discussing the victims and male 
pronouns will be used when discussing the assailants. The use of gender 
specific pronouns is meant to tailor the comment and be a reflection of 
reality. 
12. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West Supp. 1995). Rape in the 
third degree is defined as sexual intercourse with another person where 
the victim does not consent, and such lack of consent was clearly ex-
3
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prove rape, as a rape statute that more accurately reflects the 
reality of the crime. Under this statute, courts would not have 
to muddle through the assailant's behavior to find a push, 
kick, or shove to call the act rape. If the victim says "no," and 
the assailant continues, then the act is against the victim's will 
and is legally recognized as rape. Unlike rape statutes that 
require "force," this statute recognizes the victim's right to 
simply say "no" and not be physically assaulted beyond the 
penetration to prove rape. 
I. BACKGROUND 
To prove rape,13 in most states the prosecution must es-
tablish four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: sexual pene-
tration, lack of consent, force or threat of force, and mens 
rea. 14 Sexual penetration requires the penetration of a sexual 
organ, however slight. 15 Mens rea, although required in most 
states, is rarely the focus of rape trials. 16 Lack of consent is 
pressed by the victim's words or conduct. Id. 
13. Under several rape reform statutes, the crime of rape has been 
renamed to 'sexual assault' or 'criminal sexual conduct.' See, e.g., MICH. 
COMPo LAwS ANN. § 750.520 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (West 
1987); S.C. CODE §§ 16-3-651 to -654 (1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3254 
(Supp. 1994).). 
14. Lani A. Remick, Read Her Lips: An Argument For A Verbal Consent Stan-
dard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1103, 1108 (1993); See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 13A-
6-60 to 61 (1994); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1996); MD. ANN. CODE 
art. 27, § 463 (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 22(b) (West 1990); N.Y. 
PENAL LAw § 130.05, 130.30 (McKinney 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61(A)(i) 
(Michie Supp. 1995); State v. Hosey, 339 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), modi· 
fied on other grounds, 348 S.E. 2d 805 (N.C. 1986) (stating both force and 
nonconsent are essential elements of rape). 
Nonconsent has been eliminated as an element the state must prove 
in only a handful of states. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 
(1984); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 750.520a-.5201 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2c:I4-1 to -8 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). However, a consent defense is still 
available and once raised the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove 
nonconsent beyond a reasonable doubt. Remick, supra, note 14, at 1108-09. 
15. Lucy R. Harris, Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of 
Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 615 (1976). See, e.g., State v. Bruno, 424 S.E.2d 
440, 448 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), cen. denied and appeal dismissed, 428 S.E.2d 185 
(N.C. 1993) (slightest penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex 
organ is sufficient to constitute intercourse). Sexual penetration is be-
yond the scope of this article and will not be addressed. 
16. Remick, supra note 14, at 1108. Some courts have expressly stated 
that mens rea is not a required element under their statutes. Id. See, e.g., 
State v. Reed, 479 A.2d 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984) (explaining that rape does not 
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rarely defined by statute17 so many courts refer to the com-
mon-law definition to establish the element. Force or threat of 
force is also rarely defined by statute, but instead is deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, looking at the totality of the 
circumstances. 18 
A. COMMON-LAw DEFINITION: THE ELEMENT OF "FORCE" Is A 
SECONDARY ISSUE 
English common law defined rape as the carnal knowledge 
of a woman against her will.19 American courts adopted this 
definition of rape, adding the element of force. 2o Thus, under 
the common law, the prosecution had to prove three elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: carnal knowledge, force, and lack 
of consent.21 
Although force was an element the state had to prove, "the 
require a culpable state of mind); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788, 791 
(S.D. 1978) (holding intent is not an element of rape). 
17. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2689. The few states that define consent 
by statute usually define it as words or actions indicating "freely given 
consent." [d. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.366(1) (Michie 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9A.44.010 (West Supp. 1995); WIse. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (West Supp. 1995). 
The California statutory definition of consent also states that any previ-
ous dating or marital relationship between the defendant and victim does 
not by itself constitute consent. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 1996). 
To determine lack of consent courts look at the victim's resistance, be-
havior, and appearance during the assault. Cynthia A. Wicktom, Note, Fo-
cusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape 
Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 403-10 (1988). 
18. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2689-90. 
19. Wicktom, supra note 17, at 401 (citing E. COKE, THE THiRD PART OF 
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *60). Under the English common-
law, husbands had absolute legal immunity from raping their wives. Leigh 
Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S 
RTS. L. REp. 170, 184 (Spring 1980). Rape laws were originally "designed to 
protect the property rights of men to their wives and daughters." In re 
M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1273 (N.J. 1992). 
20. Wicktom, supra note 17, at 402; In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270 (ex-
plaining that the 1796 New Jersey rape statute had three elements: carnal 
knowledge, forcibly, and against her will). 
21. See, e.g., Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219, 221 (Fla. 1960) ("[tJhe com-
mon-law crime of rape is composed of three essential elements: carnal 
knowledge, force and the commission of act without consent or against 
the will of the victim."). 
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focus was on female nonconsent ... [and] force was decidedly a 
secondary issue and remained essentially unaddressed."22 
Force was "only relevant as a means of showing 
nonconsent."23 The essence of the crime was lack of consent, 
which could only be established if the victim physically resist-
ed the assailant to the "utmost" of her ability throughout the 
assault.24 To satisfy the "utmost" resistance requirement, the 
victim had to use all her physical power to combat the assail-
ant until she was overpowered or exhausted.25 If the victim 
surrendered or abandoned resistance at any point during the 
attack, this eventual acquiescence or submission was consid-
ered consent.26 
Courts required "utmost" resistance to establish 
"nonconsent" primarily due to a lack of faith in women's credi-
bility.27 The victim was viewed with distrust and thus, courts 
22. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 20. 
23. Christina M. Tchen, Rape Reform and a Statutory Consent Defense, 74 J. 
CRIM. L. 1518, 1521 (1983). The addition of the 'force' element prompted 
courts to require physical resistance. Wicktom, supra note 17, at 402. 
24. McLain v. State, 149 N.W. 771 (Wis. 1941) ("[t]o constitute rape there 
had to be an entire absence of consent, and there had to be utmost resis-
tance by the woman by all means within her power."); Starr v. State, 237 
N.W. 96 (Wis. 1931) ("[t]o constitute rape, a woman must resist to utmost, 
and voluntary submission, though yielded after assault and attempt to 
accomplish act by force, takes away essential element of crime."). Evidence 
of utmost resistance was also required to prove the secondary element of 
'force.' Mills v. United States, 164 U.S. 644, 648-49 (1897) (explaining the 
requirement that the victim must give utmost resistance to the extent of 
her ability); In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1272. 
25. King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tenn. 1962) (holding that the jury 
had to find "that the act was committed . . . against the will and consent 
of the female who must have resisted the attack in every way possible 
and continued such resistance until she was overcome by force, was insen-
sible through fright, or ceased resistance from exhaustion, fear of death 
or great bodily harm."). 
26. Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Re-
quirement from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 567, 569 
(1983); State v. Burgdorf, 53 Mo. 65, 67 (1873) (stating that "lilt certainly 
must have been a very amicable struggle indeed, which would inflict no 
bruises on the girl . .. "); Moss v. State, 45 So. 2d 125, 127 (Miss. 1950) 
(stating that "[i]nitial force was... not enough, for submission may fol-
low."). 
27. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 568, 569. Courts also asserted other 
rationales for the 'utmost' resistance requirement. Some courts insisted 
'utmost' physical resistance was the natural response of a virtuous woman. 
ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 30. Other courts argued that the 'utmost' physi-
cal resistance requirement was legitimate because if a woman did respond 
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did not want to rely on the victim's subjective testimony alone 
to establish nonconsent.28 Physical resistance was then pre-
ferred because it provided objective proof of nonconsent.29 The 
result of this "death before dishonor,,3o principle in practice, 
however, caused rape trials to focus almost exclusively on 
whether the victim responded appropriately to the assault; i.e., 
the court determined whether the victim was raped by analyz-
ing her degree of resistance.31 
B. COMMON LAw: SPECIAL EVIDENTIARY RULES & RATIONALES 
The courts' distrust of rape victims was also manifested in 
three special evidentiary rules: the corroboration requirement, 
the doctrine of "fresh complaint," and the cautionary instruc-
tion.32 The corroboration requirement forced the victim to pro-
duce independent evidence of every element of the crime.33 
The "fresh complaint" doctrine required the victim to report 
with utmost force, it was impossible to rape her. Tchen, supra note 23, at 
1522, 1524; Bohmer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the 
Court, 58 JUDICATURE 391, 398 (1975) (One judge, echoing this sentiment, 
stated that "a hostile vagina will not admit a penis. . . ."). Thus, this lat-
ter rationale essentially asserted that it is impossible to rape a woman. 
28. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 569; Tchen, supra note 23, at 1523 (stat-
ing that rape victims were viewed with "distrust"). 
29. People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118 (Cal. 1986). The court explained 
that "wariness of the complainant's credibility created 'an exaggerated 
insistence on evidence of resistance'. n Id. (quoting Lucy Harris, Comment, 
Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 619 
(1976». 
30. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 569. 
31. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1271. In a 1938 Wisconsin case, for example, 
the doctor who examined the victim testified that "she was absolutely 
terrified; she was shaking like a leaf and so incoherent it almost took 
half an hour to make anything out she said. She was very hysteri-
cal. ... finally she told me she had been out, been raped." State v. 
Hoffman, 280 N.W. 357, 361 (Wis. 1938). Although the jury convicted the 
defendant, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to 
lack of sufficient fear and utmost resistance. Id. 
32. Wicktom, supra note 17, at 410, 411. 
33. FAIRSTEIN, supra note 1, at 15. The corroboration requirement typi-
cally forced the victim to produce evidence of torn clothing, injury or 
bruises since it was rare that a witness could corroborate that the rape 
had occurred. Id. The effect of this requirement meant that in the "most 
intimate of all assaults, the crime least likely to be witnesses by anyone, 
the overwhelming percentage of victims were legally barred from ever 
presenting their stories to a jury." Id. 
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the rape immediately or right after it occurred, or there would 
be a "strong but not conclusive presumption against a wom-
an."34 Unlike any other crime, American juries were also giv-
en a cautionary instruction35 based on Lord Hale's warning in 
1671 that rape "is an accusation easily made and hard to be 
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho 
never so innocent."36 
34. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 53; Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Be· 
lieved? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1042 (1991); People v. Lutzow, 88 N.E. 1049, 1052 (Ill. 
1907) (explaining that where the victim is old enough to understand the 
offense, "it is usually regarded as a suspicious circumstance if she fails 
to make the complaint of her mistreatment as soon as she has a reason-
able opportunity to do so."). This rule was also justified on the grounds 
that it was the natural response of a rape victim to immediately report 
the rape, thus this requirement would deter false complaints. Torrey, 
supra at 1042; Steven 1. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 
FLA. L. REV. 487, 513 (1991). 
35. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 414 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(Spaeth, J., dissenting) (explaining that the cautionary instruction, among 
other special rules, was "the most striking feature of the common law . . . 
that [showed that] the alleged victim was not treated by the standard 
that victims of other crimes were treated."). 
36. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1971); 
Bienen, supra note 19, at 184 n.78. The California jury instruction, for 
example, read: "A charge such as that made against the defendant in this 
case is one which is easily made and, once made, difficult to defend 
against, even if the person accused is innocent." People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 
110, 120 n.18. (Cal. 1986); Harris, supra note 16, at 617. In 1975, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the cautionary instruction was no longer 
mandatory. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 256 (Cal. 1975). The court 
stated that it found nothing in Lord Hale's writings that supported the 
belief that juries should be instructed to view the victim's testimony as 
"presumptively entitled to less credence than those who testify as the 
alleged victim of other crimes." Id. Some judges however still believe 
juries should be warned about the 'lying rape victim.' People v. Phillips, 
536 N.E.2d 1242, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (Pincham, J., dissenting) ("This ad-
monitory truism by Lord Hale approved by our supreme court [in 1930] is 
just as accurate and viable today as it was when it was first uttered by 
Lord Hale."). In keeping with this sentiment, some states also presently 
require rape victims to submit to lie detector tests to decide whether to 
prosecute the case. Jeanette Krebs and Suzanne Cassidy, Raped, Then a Lie 
Detector Test: In Some States, Sexual Assault Victims Suffer Added Indignity of 
Taking a Polygraph Exam, SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 15, 1995, at AB. In 
California, however, law enforcement officials are prohibited from asking 
the victim to take a lie detector test and will be subject to a misdemean-
or if they do. Id. Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, Virginia, New York, Oregon 
and Michigan have also either banned the requirement that rape victims 
submit to lie detector tests or limited their use. Id. In Illinois, the 
polygraphing of rape victims was outlawed in 1988. Id. In states where the 
8
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Each special evidentiary rule was based on a presumption 
that the accused was often an "innocent" victim who needed 
extra protection from the vindicative woman who falsely cried 
rape.37 This fundamental distrust of the female rape victim 
was evident in characterizations of her as a "spumed female," 
"revengeful mistress," or a woman of "excessive or perverted 
sexuality.,,38 Scholars advocated tipping the scales in favor of 
the accused to protect him from juries who would be inordi-
nately swayed by the victim's colorful lies and rush to con-
vict.39 Accordingly, the scales were tipped and the evidentiary 
rape victims are required to take a lie detector test, which are inadmissi-
ble in court, the lie detector tests are "frequently used when women 
accuse men they know of raping them." Cheers & Jeers, THE PLAIN DEALER, 
Dec. 29, 1995, at 8B. "In some areas, prosecution of a rape suspect may 
hinge on a woman's willingness to take a polygraph and on how well she 
fares on [the] exam" - even though the test itself is "too unreliable to be 
used as evidence in a trial... " Jeanette Krebs and Suzanne Cassidy, 
Many Rape Victims Encounter Polygraph Tests, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 26, 1995, 
at 5E. 
37. Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the 
Courtroom, 77 COL. L. REV. 1, 21 (1977) (quoting 1 J. WIGMORE, J. WIGMORE ON 
EVIDENCE, § 200, at 683). Dean Wigmore warned courts about the "evil of 
putting an innocent man's liberty at the mercy of an unscrupulous and 
revengeful mistress," declaring that "[t]he real victim... too often ... 
is the innocent man. . . ." [d.; Tchen, supra note 23, at 1522. 
38. Berger, supra note 37, at 21, 27. Judge Ploscowe instructed attor-
neys to be "continually on guard" for rape complaints asserted "by the 
spurned female that has as its underlying basis a desire for revenge, or a 
blackmail or shakedown scheme." [d. at 21; See, MORRIS PLOSCOWE, Sex Offens· 
es: The American Legal Context, 25 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 223 (1960); 
MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 187-90 (1951). Wigmore also cautioned 
about "female types of excessive or perverted sexuality," advising that all 
rape victims should be psychologically tested. Berger, supra note 37, at 25. 
Wigmore stated that "[n]o judge should ever let a sex offense charge go 
to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental 
makeup ha[s] been examined and testified to by a qualified physician." [d. at 
22 (quoting 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924A, at 737 (Chadburne rev. 1970». 
Wigmore stated that "[m]odern psychiatrists have amply studied the behav-
ior of errant young girls and women coming before the court in all sorts 
of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by 
inherent defects, partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, 
partly by bad social environments, partly by temporary physiological or 
emotional conditions. One form taken of these conditions is that of con-
triving false charges of sexual offenses by men." 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 
924A, at 737 (Chadburne rev. 1970). 
39. Berger, supra note 37, at 22. Lord Hale expressed fears that the 
jury would rush to judgment. [d. The rationale was that the public 
seemed preinclined to think a man would have committed any sex crime, 
and thus the defendant needed extra protection against "the respect and 
sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female." ESTRICH, 
9
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rules remained in full force until the 1970s,40 even though the 
caricature of the lying rape victim was never substantiated.41 
Today, although all three evidentiary rules have been 
formally repealed in most jurisdictions,42 vestiges of the rules 
remain.43 Despite rape law reform, police, prosecutors, and 
jurors still give great weight to evidence of prompt com-
plaint44 and corroboration.45 
supra note 4, at 55-56 (quoting 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924A, at 736 
(Chadbume rev. 1970)). 
40. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 42. 
41. Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 335, 337 (1973); Leigh Bienen, A Question of Credibility: John Henry 
Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authority in Section 942a of the Treatise on Evidence, 
19 CAL. W. L. REV. 235 (1983). 
42. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 42. 
43. The Model Penal Code authors advised retaining the corroboration 
requirement and the cautionary instruction when they revised the Code in 
1962. Tchen, supra note 22, at 1531 n.75; Bienen, supra note 19, at 176. Un-
der the Code, conviction was prohibited based on the victim's testimony 
without corroboration. The authors explained that "[t]he corroboration 
requirement is an attempt to skew resolution of such disputes in favor of 
the defendant... [it is]. .. a determination to favor justice to the de-
fendant, even at some cost to the societal interest in effective law en-
forcement and to the personal demands of the victims for redress.» 
ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 46. Authors of the Code also retained the prompt 
complaint doctrine. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 
1962); ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 46. 
44. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 46. Although prompt complaint is not le-
gally required by the majority of states, police and prosecutors still con-
sider it important. Torrey, supra note 34, at 1043 (noting a national study 
which found that evidence of prompt complaint was the third most impor-
tant factor to prosecutors in deciding whether to file a criminal charge). 
Some prosecutors may not believe the victim has been raped if she does 
not report the crime immediately. Lisa Frohmanm, Discrediting Victims' Allega-
tions of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of Case Rejections, in RAPE & SOCI-
ETY 207 (Patricia Searles et al. eds., 1995). One prosecutor, for example, 
recently stated that the victim "didn't call the police until four hours 
later. That isn't consistent with someone who has been raped." [d. Some 
courts have also refused to admit the complaint if the victim did not re-
port the rape as soon as practicable. Torrey, supra, note 34, at 1043-1044. 
See People v. Fuelner, 432 N.E.2d 986, 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (victim didn't 
report rape until 24 hours after assault); People v. Szybeko, 181 N.E.2d 
176, 179 (Ill. 1962). Courts have also found that the failure to make a 
prompt complaint casts doubt on the victim's credibility. See, e.g., People v. 
Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240, 243 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); People v. Bain, 283 
N.E.2d 701, 703 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). Giving weight to delayed reporting how-
ever is endorsing another rape myth since it is the normal and common 
reaction to delay reporting for many rape victims. Fromm, supra at 207-08. 
For criticism of the above cases, see, Dawn M. DuBois, Note, A Matter of 
10
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c. RAPE LAw REFORM: "FORCE" BECOMES A PRIMARY ELEMENT 
Rape law reform within the last twenty years has made 
the element of "force" a primary issue in rape trials.46 This 
change is illustrated by the Model Penal Code47 and Michi-
gan48 rape reform statutes. Under both statutes, the element 
of nonconsent has been eliminated and replaced by "force" as 
the primary element.49 Other states have emulated this ap-
proach, giving new meaning to the amount of force used by the 
perpetrator. 50 
Most rape law reform occurred during the late 1970s.51 
One important goal of rape law reform was to redefine rape to 
shift the focus away from scrutinizing the victim's behavior at 
tria1.52 The element of lack of consent and resistance had en-
abled courts to focus attention solely on the propriety of the 
victim's behavior. 53 Reformers hoped to redefine the offense to 
Time: Evidence of a Victim's Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 
1087 (1988). 
45. Torrey, supra, note 34, at 1049 n.l77 (citing Feild and Bienen study 
which found that jurors typically look for injuries on the victim and 
their absence often suggests to them that no rape has occurred.); see infra 
note 36. 
46. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 84. Professor Estrich explains that most 
rape reform statutes have chosen to redefine rape, focusing on the 'force' 
element. [d. 
47. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (1980). 
48. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520(b)-(e) (West 1991). 
49. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1530, 1537. 
50. See ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 59, 71. 
51. Bienen, supra note 19, at 172. Feminists, law and order groups, and 
victims rights groups led the reform movement. Wallace D. Loh, The Impact 
of Common Law and Reform Rape Statutes on Prosecution: An Empirical Study, 
55 WASH. L. REV. 543, 567 (1980). See generally, Ronald J. Berger et aI., Rape-
Law Reform: Its Nature, Origins, and Impact, in RAPE & SOCIETY 227 (Patricia 
Searles et a1. eds., 1995). The feminist movement and feminist groups were 
considered the driving force behind reform. Loh, supra at 569-70. 
52. Patricia Searles and Ronald J. Berger, The Current Status of Rape 
Reform Legislation: An Examination of State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 
25-26 (1987). Until the late 1970s, rape continued to be legally defined as 
it had been from the 18th century. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1270 (N.J. 
1992) (explaining that 'carnal knowledge,' 'force,' and 'against her will' 
remained the primary elements of the crime until 1979.). 
53. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270-72 (stating that, "[rJape prosecutions 
turned then not so much on the forcible or assaultive character of the 
defendant's actions as on the nature of the victim's response. "). Id. at 
1272. 
11
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focus on the defendant's criminal conduct or his use of "force" 
instead.54 The result was that many states reformed their 
statutes based on the Model Penal Code, which advocated 
limited reform,55 or the Michigan statute,56 hailed as the 
first victim-oriented reform statute.57 
The Model Penal Code authors created the first rape re-
form statute in 1962.58 The Code's authors divided the crime 
into three degrees of sexual offenses based on the amount of 
force used and the relationship between the victim and offend-
er.59 Rape in the first degree was defined as sexual inter-
course when the offender "compels her to submit by force or 
threat of force of imminent death, serious bodily injury, ex-
treme pain or kidnapping .... "60 To prove first degree rape, 
the victim needed to have been seriously injured or not the 
voluntary social companion of the offender.61 Second degree 
rape was defined according to the same elements, except the 
victim could be a social companion of the offender and did not 
have to suffer any injury.62 Finally, the third degree "Gross 
54. Searles, supra note 52, at 25-26. 
55. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1531 n.75; MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980). 
56. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1537; MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520(b)-(e) 
(West 1991). 
57. Bienen, supra note 19, at 172. Professor Estrich asserts that re-
formers have two choices: "to focus on the man and seek a broader defini-
tion of force; or to focus on the woman and rely on her word as to 
nonconsent (not saying yes or at least saying no)." ESTRICH, supra note 4, 
at 84. Most reform statutes have chosen to focus on the assailant's force. 
Id. 
58. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1529; Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 
1134 (1986). The Code's rape provisions were presented to the American Law 
Institute in 1955 and then adopted in 1962. Id. (citing Model Penal Code § 
213.1 cmt. at 274 n. (1980». 
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1. (1980). The Code defines first degree 
rape as sexual intercourse where the actor compels her to submit by 
force or threat of imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or 
kidnapping, to be inflicted by anyone. Rape is a felony of the second de-
gree unless (i) in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious bodily 
injury upon anyone, or (ii) the victim was not a voluntary social companion 
of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously per-
mitted him sexual liberties, in which cases the offense is a felony of the 
first degree. The third degree gross sexual imposition statute is defined 
as sexual intercourse he compels her to submit by any threat that would 
prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution. Id. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
12
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/2
1996] RAPE LAW REFORM 253 
Sexual Imposition" statute was defined as sexual intercourse 
when the offender "compels her to submit to any threat that 
would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolu-
tion .... "63 
In their comments, the Code's authors explained that the 
element of nonconsent had been eliminated and the crime 
defined solely in terms of "force" because traditional rape law 
had placed "disproportionate emphasis upon the objective man-
ifestations by the woman.,,64 Nonconsent, however, was not 
irrelevant, i.e., the authors explained that the term "compul-
sion" was intended to encompass the element of nonconsent.65 
Resistance by the victim also remained a focus. The 
Code's commentary suggested that the authors intended to 
require the rape victim to earnestly resist under the first and 
second degree rape statutes.66 Resistance also remained a fo-
63.Id. 
64. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 commentaries at 303-04, 280-81(American 
Law Institute,. 1980); ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 58-59. The Code's authors 
stated: 
There are a number of problems that arise if too 
much emphasis is placed upon the non-consent of 
the victim as opposed to the overreaching of the 
actor. In the first place, overemphasis on non-con-
sent tends to obscure differences among the various 
circumstances covered by the law of rape. An exclu-
sive focus on non-consent would collect under one 
label the wholly uninvited and forceful attack by a 
total stranger, the excessive zeal of a sometime 
boyfriend, and the clever seducer who dupes his 
victim into believing that they are husband and 
wife. In the words of one commentator, such an 
approach would compress into a single statute a 
diversity of conduct ranging from "brutal at-
tacks . .. to half won arguments... in parked 
cars. 
MODEL PENAL CODE Commentaries § 213.1 comment at 302 (1980) (quoting 
Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Ob-
jectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 55-56 (1952). 
65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 306 (Official Draft and Re-
vised Commentaries 1980); Tchen, supra note 23, at 18 (explaining that the 
Code's commentary stated that "[c]ompulsion plainly implies non-consent."). 
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 comment at 246 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955). 
In these comments the authors stated that: "[S]ometimes, in order to make 
it perfectly clear that a token initial resistance is not enough, existing 
law specifies that the woman must resist 'to the utmost.' We believe that 
13
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cus under third degree because the statute expressly required 
force to be measured against resistance.67 
Many states followed the Code's approach, revising their 
statutes to define the "force" element as "forcible compulsion," 
"compulsion," or that which "causes" the victim to submit.68 
Statutes that used the "forcible compulsion" term typically 
defined it as force that overcomes the victim's resistance, thus 
continuing to make resistance an issue.69 States that emulat-
ed the Code's new emphasis on "force" also continued to for-
mally require the element of nonconsent. 70 
the requirements that she be 'compelled to submit' is adequate for this 
purpose." [d. 
67. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1530. 
68. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 59; Tchen, supra note 23, at 1531-1532. See, 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (1994) (rape in the first degree is when a man engages 
in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 5-14-103 (Michie 1993) (rape defined as sexual intercourse by forc-
ible compulsion); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-3-402(3) (West 1990) (second 
degree sexual assault is when the actor causes the victim's submission to 
sexual penetration by means reasonably calculated to cause submission 
against the victim's will); HAw. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (Supp. 1992) (sexual 
assault in first degree if person knowingly subjects another person to an 
act of sexual penetration by strong compulsion); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
510.040 (Baldwin 1994) (first degree rape is sexual intercourse by forcible 
compulsion); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 253 (West Supp. 1994) (gross 
sexual assault is when a person engages in a sexual act with another and 
other person submits as a result of compulsion); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 
(Vernon 1995) (rape defined as sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion); 
N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-20-03 (1985) (gross sexual imposition is when the actor 
compels the victim to submit by force or threat of force to a sexual act); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (1990) (first degree rape is sexual intercourse ac-
complished by forcible compulsion); WyO. STAT. § 6-2-302 (1977) (first degree 
sexual assault is where the actor inflicting sexual intrusion on victim 
causes victim to submit through force which is reasonably calculated to 
cause submission). 
69. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2692 n.36; See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) 
(1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9A.44.040 to 05 (WEST 1988). 
70. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1531-32. The statutes in Pennsylvania and 
New York are typical examples of those states that followed the Code, 
defining rape in terms of 'forcible compulsion' but still requiring the ele-
ment of nonconsent. Bienen, supra note 19, at 175 n.37 and n.38; ); N.Y. 
PENAL LAw § 130.35 (McKinney 1987) (first degree rape is sexual inter-
course with a female by forcible compulsion); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 
3121 (Supp. 1995) (first degree rape defined as sexual intercourse accom-
plished by forcible compUlsion or by threat of forcible compulsion that 
would prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolution). 
14
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Essentially, although the Code created many significant 
changes that reformers later used, other aspects of the Code's 
reformulation limited its appeal. 71 The Code's inclusion of a 
corroboration requirement, the prompt complaint doctrine, and 
the defense of mistake of age "were incompatible with the 
goals of feminist lobbying for rape reform legislation."72 Other 
ostensible limitations were the resistance requirement and 
categorical rejection of allowing married women to assert rape 
charges against their husbands.73 The Code's biases against 
other acquaintance rapes also limited the effect the statute 
would have on the majority of rape cases.74 Although these 
factors limited its appeal to feminist reformers, by 1980, thirty-
nine states had revised their statutes based on some aspects of 
the Model Penal Code.75 
The limited changes brought about as a result of the 
Code's redefinition prompted "reformers to write their own 
laws."76 The result was the 1974 Michigan "criminal sexual 
conduct" statute, which divided sex offenses into four different 
degrees.77 First and third degree criminalized sexual penetra-
71. Bienen, supra note 19, at 175 (stating that ". .. the Model Penal 
Code's formulation of sex offenses was based upon 'a 1950's view that rape 
was a crime fantasized by pseudo-victims ... " Id. at 176). 
72. Id. at 175. 
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (1980). The Code's authors stated that 
the traditional reason for not allowing married women to assert rape 
charges against their husbands is probably based in the "wife as chattel" 
idea. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 343 (1980). The author argued 
that this aspect of rape law should be retained to avoid "unwarranted 
intrusion of the penal law into the life of the family." Id. at 345. 
74. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 comment at 307 (1980). The Code's authors 
stated that "the gravity of the wrong is arguably less severe" when there 
is a prior relationship between the victim and accused. Id. 
75. Bienen, supra note 19, at 175 n.31. 
76. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1537. "The Michigan reform statute was 
largely the work of the Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape." Estrich, 
supra note 58, at 1147. 
77. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520 (West 1995). Section 750.520(b): First 
degree criminal sexual conduct includes in part: 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in 
the first degree if he or she engages in sexual pen-
etration with another person and if any of the fol-
lowing circumstances exists: 
(a) That other person is under 13 years of age. 
(c) Sexual penetration occurs under circumstances 
involving the commission of any other felony. 
15
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(d) The actor is aided or abetted by 1 or more 
other persons and either of the following circum-
stances exists: 
(i) The actor knows or has reason to know 
that the victim is mentally incapable, mental-
ly incapable, mentally in capacitated, or phys-
ically helpless. 
(ii) The actor uses force or coercion to accom-
plish the sexual penetration. Force or coercion 
includes but is not limited to any of the 
circumstances listed in subdivision (0 (i) to 
(v). 
(e) The actor is armed with a weapon or any article 
used or fashioned in a manner to lead the victim to 
reasonably believe it to be a weapon. 
(0 The actor causes personal injury to the victim 
and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual 
penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not 
limited to any of the following circumstances: 
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim 
through the actual application of physical 
force or physical violence. 
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to 
submit by threatening to use force or violence 
on the victim, and the victim believes that 
the actor has the present ability to execute 
these threats. 
(iii) When the actor coerces the victim to 
submit by threatening to retaliate in the 
future against the victim, or any other per-
son, and the victim believes that the actor 
has the ability to execute the threat . . . 
[Vol. 26:241 
Section 750.520(c): Second degree criminal sexual conduct includes in part: 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the 
second degree if the person engages in sexual conduct 
with another person and if any of the following circum-
stances exist: 
(iii) The actor is in a position of authority 
over the victim and the actor used this au-
thority to coerce the victim to submit. 
(d)(ii) The actors uses force or coercion to accom-
plish the sexual contact . . . 
Section 750.520(d): Third degree criminal sexual conduct includes in part: 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the 
third degree if the person engages in sexual penetration 
with another person and if any of the following circum-
stances exist: 
(b) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the 
sexual penetration. Force and coercion includes but 
is not limited to any of the circumstances listed in 
section 520(1)(0(i) to (v). 
Section 750.520(e): Fourth degree criminal sexual conduct includes in part: 
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the 
16
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tion by "force or coercion. ,,78 Second and fourth degree 
criminalized sexual contact by "force or coercion."79 
Nonconsent was eliminated as an element80 and the statute 
expressly stated that the victim did not need to resist under 
any degree.81 
Although the Michigan law criminalized a broader range 
of conduct by allowing "force or coercion, ,,82 only a handful of 
states adopted this approach by "explicitly including coer-
cion. ,,83 In addition, only three other states eliminated 
nonconsent as an element the state had to prove.84 More 
states, however, did follow Michigan's lead by repealing the 
resistance requirement.85 
fourth degree if he or she engages in sexual contact with 
another person and if any of the following circumstances 
exist: 
(a) Force or coercion is used to accomplish the 
sexual contact. Force or coercion includes but is not 
limited to any of the circumstances listed in section 
520b(1)(f)(i) to (iv). 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520 (West 1995). 
78. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 750.520(b)(d) (West 1991). 
79. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520(c)(e) (Supp. 1995). 
80. [d.; People v. Nelson, 261 N.w.2d 299, 307 n.31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977), 
modified on other grounds, 281 N.W.2d 134 (Mich. 1979) (quoting The Michigan 
House Judiciary which stated that: "[tjhe question as to whether or not 
the victim "consented" is not an issue in any other felony other than 
rape. This bill would make the rape standard consistent with the standard 
for other felonies by allowing the victim to assess rationally the danger 
of injury or death and conduct herselfJhimself accordingly.") (House Judi-
ciary Committee analysis of Senate Bill 1207 (June 27, 1974)). 
81. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 85-86. 
82. MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520(b) to (e) (Supp. 1995). The statute 
also provided a non-exclusive list of objective factors which satisfied the 
'force' or 'coercion' element. Wicktom, supra note 16, at 419. 
83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1988) (rape is sexual intercourse accom-
plished by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and un-
lawful bodily injury); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344 (West 1987) (third degree 
criminal sexual conduct is defined as sexual penetration accomplished by 
force or coercion); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:I4-2 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
30-9-11 (Michie 1994) (first degree criminal sexual penetration is sexual 
penetration by the use of force or coercion that results in great bodily 
harm or great mental anguish to the victim); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 11-37-1, -2 
(1994); S.C. CODE §§ 16-3-651 to -654 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN~ § 22-22-1 
(1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-503 (Supp. 1995). 
84. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2789 (explaining that "[slome states have 
eliminated lack of consent as an element of the crime but provide that 
victim consent is a defense."). 
85. States that repealed the resistance requirement include: ALAsKA 
17
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Despite the fact that the Michigan statute has been con-
sidered the first victim-oriented rape law, commentators have 
criticized it as traditional in some aspects.S6 Professor Estrich 
has criticized the statute's definition of "force or coercion" as 
limiting the "statute's application to cases of conventional 
violence" while not addressing non-violent rape cases.87 One 
definition of "force or coercion," for example, requires the per-
petrator to overcome the victim through actual physical vio-
lence or force. ss Professor Estrich has argued that this defini-
tion enables courts to apply a limited understanding of what 
"force" is and ignore the vast majority of rape cases that occur 
without injury or physical brutality.s9 
Others have criticized the elimination of the element of 
consent as "less consistent with the feminist goal of 
criminalizing a wider range of nonconsensual contacts, since 
the only illegal contacts are those associated with a particular 
specified set of criminal circumstances."9o Again, this criticism 
is directed at the narrow definition of rape which only 
criminalizes rape when physical force is used.91 Statutes that 
prohibit nonconsensual penetration without any showing of 
force, unlike the Michigan statute, are considered to be more 
consistent with feminist goals of reform.92 
D. RESULTS OF REFORM: How THE "FORCE" ELEMENT Is 
PRESENTLY DEFINED 
Rape law reform increased emphasis on the assailant's use 
of force, but left the element essentially undefined.93 Courts 
STAT. § 11.41.470(4)(A) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (Supp. 1987); 
MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520(i) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(2) 
(West 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) (Anderson 1993); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, § 3107 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-12 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, § 3254 (Supp. 1994). 
86. Estrich, supra note 58, at 1150-1151; ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 84-88. 
87. Estrich, supra note 58, at 1151. 
88. MICH. COMPo LAwS ANN. § 750.520b(1)(O(i) (West 1991). 
89. Estrich, supra note 58, at 1155. 
90. Searles, supra note 52, at 26. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2689-2690. In New Jersey, for example, 
rape reform occurred in 1978. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (1992). "Since the 
18
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and legislatures, in fact, have rarely defined what "force" or 
"threat of force" actually is,94 indicating the standard may 
simply be a "I know it when I see it" rule.95 One court has 
argued that "force" does not need to be defined because "a 
person of common intelligence and experience [can] distin-
guish, without difficulty, between sexual acts accomplished by 
force ... and for example sexual activity between consenting 
adults."96 Courts, however, have often struggled to distinguish 
what kind of conduct satisfies the element of "force" or "threat 
of force. ,,97 
Despite the ambiguity, the state must show that the 
defendant used either actual physical force or threatened to 
use actual physical force likely to cause serious bodily inju-
ry.98 Courts typically require the "force" to be beyond that in-
herent in penetration and enough to establish that the sex was 
involuntary.99 Again, most courts do not mandate that a par-
1978 refonn, the [New Jersey} Code has referred to the crime that was 
once known as "rape" as "sexual assault." The crime now requires "penetra-
tion," not "intercourse." It requires "force" or "coercion," not "submission" 
or "resistance."" Id. at 1275. However, "the refonn statute defines sexual 
assault as penetration accomplished by the use of "physical force" or "co-
ercion," but it does not define either "physical force" or "coercion"... 
[t}he task of defining "physical force" therefore was left to the courts. 
That definitional task runs the risk of undermining the basic legislative 
intent to refonnulate rape law." Id. 
94. Id. 
95. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 60. 
96. People v. Bowen, 609 N.E.2d 346, 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (defendant 
asserted that the definition of 'force' was unconstitutionally vague and 
an average, intelligent person could not determine what degree of 'force' 
was required.). 
97. See In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992) (holding 'force' can be sat-
isfied by penetration in order to avoid requiring the victim to resist); Com-
monwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1346 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating 
that "[w}hat is comparably uncertain, however, in the absence of either an 
injury or resistance requirement, is the precise degree of actual physical 
force necessary to prove "forcible compulsion."); Commonwealth v. 
Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
98. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw 523 (1993). 
99. State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532, 535 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). Professor 
Estrich explains that the kind of 'force' many courts look for "is force 
used to overcome female nonconsent." ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 60. For 
some courts, the concept of consent is retained in the 'force' element, 
which is considered its "conceptual opposite." State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483, 
486 (Wash. 1989). One court states that "[w}hile some have suggested that 
rape law refonn has eliminated consent as an issue in rape prosecu-
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ticular amount of force or threatened force be used, stating 
that the degree of force is relative and depends on the totality 
of the circumstances. 100 In practice, this means that many 
courts determine if force is present on a case-by-case basis, 
depending on the particular facts of each case and each judge's 
understanding of what type of conduct is equivalent to 
"force."lOl 
Where the victim asserts that the threat of force was used, 
as is often the case in acquaintance rapes, some courts have 
set out factors to be considered. First, the threat does not need 
to be expressly made by words or the brandishing of a weapon, 
i.e., the threat of force can by implied by the defendant's acts 
alone. l02 The threat of force must, however, usually show that 
the victim was placed in real apprehension of imminent and 
serious bodily harm and that this fear was objectively reason-
able under the circumstances. l03 To determine if the fear was 
reasonable, courts may consider the respective ages, physical 
sizes and mental conditions of the victim and defendant. 104 
Other factors to consider include the physical setting of the 
tions, . .. the substitution of "forcible compulsion" for lack of consent 
seems more of a refinement than a reformulation." [d. 
100. People v. Patterson, 410 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Mich. 1987) (stating that 
coercive circumstances are determined looking at the totality of the cir-
cumstances); Prokop v. State, 28 N.W.2d 200, 203 (Neb. 1947) (explaining that 
the degree of force is relative and depends on the circumstances, but 
must be enough to overcome the victim); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 
1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (stating that determination of forcible compulsion or 
threat of forcible compulsion depends on the totality of circumstances in 
each case). 
101. State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 726 (Md. Ct. App. 1981) (explaining that 
no particular amount of force is required but depends on the circumstanc-
es); Berliner, supra note I, at 2690. 
102. State v. Gossett and Clapper, 808 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1991). 
103. People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 122 n.20 (Cal. 1986) (holding that the 
victim's fear must be reasonable, but it may be unreasonable if the defen-
dant "knowingly takes advantage of that fear."); Goldberg v. State, 395 
A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Rusk, 424 A.2d at 726-27 (holding that 
the victim's fear must be reasonable as well as honest); Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 
at 398 (stating coercion is established according to an objective test). At 
least one court has held that the victim's fear does not have to be rea-
sonable, but is instead to be viewed subjectively, from the eyes of the vic-
tim. Salsman v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 638 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
104. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 419 (Spaeth, J., dissenting); Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 
at 1344. 
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assault, such as whether the victim was in an isolated place, 
and "the extent to which the accused may have been in a posi-
tion of authority, domination or custodial control over the vic-
tim .... "105 
In some states, the victim is required to resist the assail-
ant in order to satisfy the "force" element.106 In states that 
require victim resistance, "force" is not defined independently 
but is instead defined in relation to the victim's response. 107 
Some states require "earnest" resistance,108 while others re-
quire "reasonable" resistance. 109 In a few states, resistance 
may also include means other than just physical. 110 If, howev-
er, the victim did not resist, she must show that the resistance 
was futile or that the "physical resistance would increase the 
likelihood of violence by the perpetrator."m Still, despite the 
105. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1344. 
106. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9A.44.010(6) (Supp. 1995). Although Pennsylvania has repealed the resistance 
requirement, the court has continued to require resistance in practice. 
Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1338. 
107. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2692. (explaining that forcible compulsion 
statutes usually define that term to mean force or threats of force to 
overcome some level of resistance). 
108. Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 720, 721 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (requiring 
the victim show earnest resistance to satisfy forcible compulsion element); 
State v. Lima, 643 P.2d 536, 540 (Haw. 1982) (requiring the victim to show 
earnest resistance which must involve "a genuine physical effort" by vic-
tim); State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah 1987) (requiring the 
victim show earnest resistance); State v. O'Donnell, 433 S.E.2d 566, 570 (W. 
Va. 1993) (requiring the victim to show she responded with earnest resis-
tance to satisfy the forcible compulsion element). 
109. McQueen v. State, 473 So. 2d 971 (Miss. 1985); State v. Marlow, 888 
S.W.2d 417, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (forcible compulsion requires physical 
force that overcomes reasonable resistance); People v. Dozier, 85 A.2d 846 
(N.Y. 1981) (reasonable resistance required). 
110. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 534 (forcible compulsion does not require that 
the victim show she offered just physical resistance in all cases); People 
v. Dozier, 85 A.2d 846 (N.Y. 1981) (reasonable resistance is not confined to 
physical resistance but also includes escaping or crying out only if the 
resistance would increase the likelihood of violence); State v. Reed, 276 
S.E.2d 313, 317 (W.Va. 1981) (earnest resistance includes means other than 
just physical). 
111. State v. Simmons, 621 So.2d 1135, 1137-1138 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (victim 
must show that she was prevented from resisting by force or the threat 
of physical force and show that it was reasonable to believe that resis-
tance would not prevent the rape). The recent trend has been for states 
to eliminate the resistance requirement or enlarge the definition of resis-
tance to include non-physical resistance. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 534. 
21
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acknowledgment that resistance may be impossible, some 
courts have reserved the right to require physical resis-
tance. 1l2 
Resistance may also remain a factor in states that have 
repealed the resistance requirement113 for two reasons. First, 
some courts have simply ignored legislative intent and re-
quired resistance in practice.114 In Alaska, for example, even 
112. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 534 (court has reserved right to require physi-
cal resistance if it feels it should have been manifested under the cir-
cumstances). 
113. These states have repealed the resistance requirement: ALAsKA STAT. 
§ 11.41.470(4)(A) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-17 (Supp. 1987); MICH. 
COMPo LAws ANN. § 750.520(i) (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347(2) (West 
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(C) (Anderson 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, § 3107 (1983); R.1. GEN. LAws § 11-37-12 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 
3254 (Supp. 1994). States which have "forcible compulsion" as an element, 
however, generally define it as force that overcomes resistance. See, e.g., 
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(8) (1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (Supp. 1995); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West 1988). Thus, resistance is still a 
factor in these states. 
114. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (although the resistance requirement had 
been repealed, the court reversed the rape conviction based on lack of 
physical resistance by victim); Wicktom, supra note 17, at 405 (explaining 
that although Alaska has repealed the resistance requirement the courts 
have continued to require physical resistance as a practical matter). In 
California, for example, although the resistance requirement has been 
repealed, the trial judge in a sexual harassment suit indicated that the 
victim should have resisted. The plaintiff alleged her supervisor had 
raped her. The judge, however, was "so convinced that a woman who is 
"truly" raped must offer physical resistance that, even though the super-
visor admitted the assault in a phone call monitored by the police, the 
judge was unable to see past his own preconceptions." Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Blinded By Rape Myths, THE NATIONAL LAw JOURNAL, Sept. 11, 1995, 
at A21 (discussing Catchpole v. Brannon, 36 Cal. App. 4th 237 (1995». The 
trial judge said the" plaintiff was at fault for not successfully resisting," 
called the case "nonsense," and subjected the plaintiff to a brutal inter-
rogation in court. [d. When an expert witness from a rape crisis team tes-
tified that the plaintiff had symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the "judge 
derided her testimony by suggesting the witness "should check and see if they 
come in with a big 'R' stamped on their forehead in red letters, and then we'll all 
know." Brannon, 36 Cal. App. 4th at 253. The plaintiff appealed asking for 
the judgment to be set aside on the grounds of judicial gender bias and 
violation of due process of law. [d. at 245-246. The appellate court con-
cluded that "the judgment seems to have improperly turned on stereotypes 
about women rather than a realistic evaluation of the facts,... a prob-
lem apparently all too common in sexual harassment cases." [d. at 260. The 
court stated that "[m]en, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may 
view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social 
setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive. 
22
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though the statute does not require physical resistance, the 
courts have interpreted it to require physical resistance as a 
practical matter.115 Second, resistance has been "maintained 
as a 'ghost element of rape,'" -although explicitly not required 
by some states, "it nevertheless remains an unacknowledged 
yardstick for courts when evaluating evidence of 
force .... "116 Thus, in many states, courts continue to re-
quire the victim to resist in practice or by law. 
II. ACQUAINTANCE RAPE MYTHS & THE ELEMENT OF 
"FORCE" 
Despite rape law reform, the "violent stranger" rape myth 
continues to hinder acquaintance rape prosecution. The ten-
dency to believe that "real" rape is committed by a stranger 
and is necessarily violent causes the acquaintance rape to look 
like it is not "rape," but is instead consensual sex.l17 Thus, 
dispelling the myth is necessary to successfully prosecute ac-
quaintance rape and accurately apply the "force" element. 
The immobilizing fear a physically powerful and sexually driven man may 
understandably inspire in a woman and the possibility resistance might 
exacerbate the danger may not be obvious to some men, but it cannot be 
fairly ignored by the trier of fact in a sexual harassment case." Id. The 
court also stated that the resistance requirement had been repealed in 
criminal law, and that the same standard should apply to civil cases. Id. 
at 262. Thus, the court reversed the judgment, stating that trial court's 
decision had been "based on stereotyped thinking about the nature and 
roles of women and myths and misconceptions about the economic and 
social realities of women's lives." Id. See also In re Marriage of Iverson, 11 
Cal. App. 4th 1495, 1498-1500 (1992) (finding trial judge's gender bias de-
prived female litigant of fair trial where judge found against the wife 
while referring to her as a "lovely girl," stating that she had "nothing 
going for her except for her physical attractiveness," and thus was not 
credible, and referring "to the fact that the couple was living together 
before their marriage," stated "[a]nd why, in heaven's name, do you buy the 
cow when you get the milk free . . . "). 
115. Wicktom, supra note 17, at 405. 
116. Remick, supra, note 14, at 1113 (quoting Berliner, supra note 1, at 
2691-2692). 
117. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 69. 
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A. RAPE MYTHS 
Many people believe that rape occurs in only narrowly 
defined scenarios, where a mentally deranged stranger1l8 
spontaneously jumps out from an alley and attacks the victim, 
either brandishing a weapon or physically injuring her.1l9 In-
dicative of the violence jurors believe rape involves, many 
jurors also believe that the absence of injuries proves there 
was no rape. 120 Again expecting violence, many jurors believe 
that victims physically resist assailants and that resistance 
should be a major factor to determine if the act was rape. 121 
118. Torrey, supra note 34, at 1048. A 1980 study conducted by Field and 
Bienen involving 1,056 male and female subjects found that 57 percent of 
the potential jurors believed that rapists are mentally ill, 83 percent 
believed that rapists are sexually frustrated persons, and 85 percent of 
the potential jurors believed that rapists are not 'normal' men. [d. (citing 
HUBERT S. FIELD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 56, 57 (1980». 
119. Berger, supra note 37, at 24. 
120. Torrey, supra note 34, at 1049. 
121. The Field and Bienen study also found that 59 percent of the ju-
rors believed that the victim should physically resist as much as possible 
and 32 percent felt that the victim's resistance should be the major fac-
tor to determine whether a woman was raped. Torrey, supra note 34, at 
1049. Based on these findings, Feild and Bienen concluded: 
In deciding rape cases, jurors typically look for 
corroborating evidence as an indication that a rape 
has occurred. One form of proof frequently consid-
ered as evidence of forcible rape is the physical 
condition of the victim. The presence of bruises, 
scratches, or cuts is taken as one form of proof 
that the victim did not consent to intercourse. Their 
absence, however, may suggest to some jurors that a rape 
did not take place. The insistence of active victim 
resistance by jurors, the courts, or the police may 
produce a conflict situation for [the victim]. On the 
one hand, she may be told by the police or experts 
in victimology to do as her attacker directs; compli-
ance is the best course for self-protection. Society 
as well as the criminal justice system, however, 
typically insists upon resistance as proof of rape. 
Our data confirm this insistence among many of the 
citizens in the sample. 
[d. at n.l77. (quoting FIELD & BIENEN, supra note 117 at 57) (emphasis add-
ed). The study also found that 66 percent of the potential jurors also 
believed that rape is the victim's fault. [d. at 1047-1048. Researchers of 
this study concluded that, "Most of the potential jurors in the study 
fared only slightly better on the rape knowledge test than if they had 
simply guessed on the fourteen questions." [d. at 1049. 
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Due to the expectation of violence, jurors feel the victim's ver-
bal plea to stop the assault is not necessarily probative. 122 
This view of "rape" leads both jurors and judges to dis-
count acquaintance rape. Some trial judges, for example, re-
cently characterized acquaintance rape as "friendly rape," "felo-
nious gallantry," "assault with failure to please," and ''breach 
of contract."123 Another trial judge justified sentencing a con-
victed rapist to probation because the victim and assailant had 
been friends. 124 A good number of rape trial judges also re-
veal their biases against the acquaintance rape victim and 
convey this bias to the jury by non-verbal cues, such as shak-
ing their head in disbelief while the victim is testifying. 125 
122. HUBERT S. FIELD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 51 (1980). The 
Field and Bienen study found that 29 percent of the potential jurors 
questioned believed that the acquaintance rape victim is merely a "woman 
who [has] changed her mind afterwards." Id. In keeping with this sentiment, 
one judge presiding over a rape trial in 1982 stated: 
Women who say no do not always mean no. It is not 
just a question of saying no, it is a question of how 
she says it, how she shows it and makes it clear. If 
she doesn't want it she only has to keep her legs 
shut and she would not get it without force and 
there would be marks of force being used. 
Torrey, supra note 34, at 1046 n.161. 
123. Torrey, supra note 34, at 1055, 1056 (citing a Carol Bohmer study 
which involved interviewing 38 Pennsylvania rape trial judges who gave 
these responses to a scenario where a woman goes to a bar, meets a man, 
gets a ride home from him, and he rapes her). Judges have also made 
statements that justify rape or express empathy for the rapist. John 
Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for "No" to Really Mean "No," 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 3, 
9 (1993). One judge, for example, stated that "I believe that it is wrong to 
entice a man knowing the situation you're creating and then saying 'no.' 
There is a button a man has that cannot be turned off and on like a 
light switch. And a man can go to prison for a very long time because of 
it." Id. 
124. Allison West, Tougher Prosecution When the Rapist is Not a Stranger, 24 
GoLDEN GATE L. REV. 169, 186 n.57 (1994). This case was decided in 1993 in 
Baltimore. Id. The judge compared the rape to larceny, where a person 
may "leave your pocketbook on the bench and I take it. .. which is less 
serious." Id. Other judges have found similar justifications for giving con-
victed rapists light sentences. In 1989, for example, a judge gave a lenient 
sentence to a convicted rapist and justified his decision by explaining, "it's 
not like she was chopped up." Friedland, supra note 34, at 495. Another 
example is a 1990 Florida case. There, the judge ignored sentencing guide-
lines and gave the self-admitted rapist probation. In open court, the judge 
called the rape victim "pitiful," and stated that "[a]nyone who could be so 
stupid to take up with this woman deserves some consideration." Torrey, 
supra note 34, at 1056-1057 n. 216 (quoting Florida judge Kenneth Lerner). 
125. ALICE VACHSS, SEX CRIMES 87 (1993). Sex crimes prosecutor Alice 
25
Edwards: Rape Law Reform
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
266 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:241 
Mirroring beliefs of many judges, jurors also tend to dis-
count acquaintance rape or acquit the defendant due to unrea-
sonable doubts. 126 If the victim and defendant know each oth-
er, for example, juries are simply less likely to convict. 127 
Kalven and Zeisel's noted jury study supports this conten-
tion,128 finding that jurors convicted the acquaintance rapist 
only three times out of forty-two cases when the presiding 
judge would have convicted the accused seven times as of-
ten. 129 Juror statements reveal similar biases. As one jury 
Vachss has stated that a good number of judges let the jury know their 
biases against the rape victim by non-verbal cues, such as shaking their 
head in disbelief while the rape victim is testifying. Id. Vachss explained 
that in one rape trial she prosecuted, the "judge spent all her time dur-
ing the victim's testimony shaking her head in disbelief." Id. Vachss stated 
that the victim "had enough belief in herself, at least, to walk into a 
courtroom and tell a jury that it was wrong for her to be raped," but 
"[t]he judge, sitting behind the victim, judgmental, told the jury by her 
conduct that wasn't true," i.e., that the teenage girl had not really been 
raped. Id. Vachss also stated that this behavior by judges was unfortunate 
because juries often look to the judge for permission to allow rape myths 
to determine the verdict. Id. 
126. Roger C. Park, The Crime Bill of 1994 and the Law of Character Evi-
dence: Congress was Right About Consent Defense Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
271 (1995) (explaining that in acquaintance rape cases jurors tend to act 
on doubts that are not reasonable doubts). 
Jurors also tend to act on irrational doubts in some stranger rape 
cases as well, although this is more rare. Two cases illustrate this. In a 
1989 Florida rape case, the jury acquitted the defendant who had kid-
napped and raped the victim at knifepoint ostensibly because she was wear-
ing a short skirt without underwear. State v. Lord, Jury Blames Woman in 
Rape Case, MIAMI HERALD, October 5, 1989, at lA (Broward Cir. Ct. Oct. 4, 
1989). The foreman explaining that "[s]he asked for it . . . [s]he was adver-
tising for sex," while another juror stated that "[w]e felt she was up to 
no good [by] the way she was dressed." FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS-SUN SENTI-
NEL, October 6, 1989, at lA. In a 1992 Texas rape case, the grand jury re-
fused to indict a man who had broken into the victim's apartment at 3 a.m. 
and raped her at knifepoint since the victim had begged the man to wear a 
condom so that she would not get AIDS. Ross E. Milloy, Furor Over a Deci-
sion Not to Indict a Rape Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1992, at A30. One juror 
explained that the "woman's act of self-protection might have implied her 
consent." Second Jury to Hear Condom Rape Case, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 
25, 1992, at A10. See, Carla M. da Luz et aI, The Texas 'Condom-Rape' Case: 
Caution Construed As Consent, 3 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 95 (1993). 
127. GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
SEXUAL AsSAULT 155, 226 (1989). 
128. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 253-254 (1966). 
129. Id.; Berger, supra, note 37, at 30. Acquaintance rapists have often 
been acquitted even though their conduct was similar to the stranger 
rapist who was convicted. Berliner, supra note 1, at 2690. Courts have 
found the defendant's intimidating behavior to constitute an implied 
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foreman explained after a 1991 rape trial, "if it had been a 
stranger who broke into the house, we probably would have 
taken it more seriously, but this was a neighbor, someone she 
knew. "130 
B. THE REALITY 
The myths adhered to by judges and jurors are worlds 
away from how the vast majority of rapes actually occur. First, 
the assailant is what most people would consider a "regular" 
guy who looks like part of the community and has "the same 
range of physical, personality and sociocultural characteristics 
found in the general population of men.,,131 Most rapists also 
threat of force when the defendant and victim are strangers, for example, 
but exhibit reluctance to view similar conduct an implied threat of force 
when the two are acquainted. Id. See, e.g., the following stranger rape 
cases where implied threat of force was found: People v. La Salle, 103 
Cal. App. 3d 139 (1980) (defendant coerced victim into car by refusing to 
return her child); People v. Dorsey, 429 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980) (defendant 
trapped woman in elevator). See, e.g., for examples of acquaintance rape 
cases where the court did not find an implied threat of force: State v. 
Lester, 321 S.E.2d 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (victim's father beat mother and 
got angry at victim's refusal); People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1975) (de-
fendant suggested that he may kill or hurt the victim). 
130. West, supra note 124, at 187. Judges and jurors are not the only 
participants in the criminal justice system who discount acquaintance rape. 
Many police officers believe that a "woman who has been raped by a man 
she knows is a woman 'who changed her mind afterward.' Id. Reporter 
Mark Richie explained one acquaintance rape victim's encounter with the 
police in Florida on the CBS Evening News, April 5, 1991. Lopez, supra note 
11, at 286-287 n.54. The man went to the victim's house, just to talk, and 
then raped her. Id. After the victim reported the assault to the police, 
she returned to the police station with her underwear. Id. The police 
told her, "Honey, why don't you go home and forget about it." Id. 
131. MARCIA M. BOUMIL et aI., DATE RAPE 37 (1993); FAIRSTEIN, supra note 1, 
at 135. A study by Eugene Kanin of Purdue University found that 71 self-
disclosed date rapists were all men from middle-class backgrounds who 
had no history of violence; all the men stated that before the rape they 
had "planned or hoped for a seduction to result." WARSHAW, supra note 1, 
at 86. Other studies indicate that 'regular' guys are the assailants. JAMES 
V.P. CHECK & NEIL M. MALAMUTH, An Empirical Assessment of Some Feminist 
Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT'L J. WOMEN'S STUDIES 415 (1985). One study 
found that "[d]espite... numerous efforts to identify ways in which rap-
ists are abnormal, the results have generally indicated very few differ-
ences between rapists and nonrapists which could justify any conclusion 
that rapists are grossly abnormaL" Id. See also Todd Tieger, Self-Rated Like-
lihood of Raping and the Social Perception of Rape, 15 J, RES. PERSONALITY 147 
(1981). A 1982 study at Kent State University found that "more than 30 
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"present an "attractive" package, in that they are usually em-
ployed, often married with children, [and] rarely [have] any 
documented criminal history . . . ,,132 Based on these findings, 
it is not surprising that many victims are voluntarily with the 
"attractive" assailant and allow themselves to be vulnerable at 
the time of the attack. 133 
Studies have also demonstrated that assailants do not 
typically use physical violence to rape,134 but instead general-
percent of the male students admitted to using physical force or threats 
and coercion to get sex when the women they were with were unwilling 
to consent, and 4 percent more actually admitted to using violence." 
LEDRAY, supra note 1, at 21. Other studies have shown that gang rape fre-
quently occurs at elite college fraternity organizations. WARSHAW, supra 
note 1, at 104-105. In 1985, for example, "the Association of American 
Colleges' Project on the Status and Education of Women reported that it 
had found more than 50 incidents of gang rape on U.S. campuses, most 
occurring at fraternity parties." Id. at 105. Evidence also suggests that 
rape is "particularly pervasive" among college athletes as well and that 
both the athletes and fraternity men view rape as "sport." Fromm, supra 
note 2, at 598-99. 
132. FAIRSTEIN, supra note 1, at 135, 240. One acquaintance rape victim ex-
plained that the men who had raped her blended into the community. 
WARSHAW, supra, note 1, at 86. The victim stated that, "[b]oth of the guys 
were Joe Average types. The first was reasonably attractive; the second, 
less so. Both were intelligent and articulate. Nothing about their exteri-
or packaging spelled RAPIST. Neither of them, especially in the free cli-
mate of the 1970s, needed to rape women in order to have sex." Id. 
133. FAIRSTEIN, supra note 1, at 133. Fairstein explains that in acquain-
tance or "confidence" rape, "the rapist has gained control over the victim 
by winning her trust to at least some degree before the crime occurs." Id. 
at 132. Fairstein states that "most sexual assaults occur when there is a 
combination of two critical conditions: opportunity and vulnerability. The 
rapist needs the opportunity to commit the crime, and he succeeds when a 
victim is vulnerable at the moment of his opportunity . . . She was vulnera-
ble precisely because she did know her assailant; she was vulnerable be-
cause she trusted him. And we rarely speak with a survivor attacked by a 
co-worker, date, friend, or relative who doesn't tell us that the reason 
they were together (and usually together alone) was because she knew 
and trusted him." Id. Thus, although the public often blames the victim 
for the assault, the only crime she has committed is trusting the untrust-
worthy. Id. Research also shows that the victim is clearly not responsible 
for the rape since 82 percent of sexual assaults are planned or partly 
planned by the assailant before the rape occurs. Torrey, supra note 34, at 
1027. Thus, the victim's behavior at the time of the assault also does not 
cause the rape. DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM'S 
PERSPECTIVE 189 (1975) (citing the Federal Commission on Crimes of Vio-
lence report which found that only "4% of reported rapes involved any 
precipitative behavior on the part of the victim."). 
134. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1278 (N.J. 1992) (explaining that "contrary 
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ly use verbal coercion135 or manipulation. 136 Indicative of 
the subtle force used, most assailants do not use weapons and 
the victims rarely have any external or internal injuries. 137 
What victims point to instead as the "force" used is the 
assailant's size, his verbal attacks, his anger, and his refusal to 
acknowledge repeated verbal resistance. 13S A low-level of 
"force" then, which is often quite subtle, is the most typical 
degree of force used. 139 These findings support the assertion 
that, while the presence of overt force may be probative of 
rape, its absence is not. 
to common myths, perpetrators generally do not use guns or knives and 
victims generally do not suffer external bruises or cuts); Loh, supra note 
51, at 590 (explaining that the "typical assault itself is not of an aggra-
vated kind. One-fourth of the assaults involve no physical force (other 
than the act of penetration. When extrinsic force is used, it is moderate 
(retraining; 42%), rather than high (choking, hitting; 32%)."). 
135. Menachim Amir, Forcible Rape, in RAPE VICTIMOLOGY 45 (1975). Another 
study also found that a "large percentage of women will capitulate on 
verbal threats alone." WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 89. 
136. West, supra note 124, at 172. 
137. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1278; FAIRSTEIN, supra note 1, at 153, 261-262. Sex 
crimes prosecutor Linda Fairstein explained: "I came to learn that the 
overwhelming number of rape cases occur with no demonstrable physical 
injury done to the victim. Injury is not an element of the crime." [d. at 
57-58. 
138. WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 89. For example, one rape victim stated 
that "I felt physically threatened because of his anger... [hle kept at-
tacking me verbally... " [d. Another acquaintance rape victim explained 
that after she went to the assailant's home with him, he kept begging 
with her to have sex with him. [d. at 37. The man placed himself on top of 
her so she couldn't move and essentially argued with her while she was 
crying and saying 'no.' [d. Despite her repeated verbal refusals, he eventu-
ally raped her. [d. 
[d. 
139. Loh, supra note 51, at 590. Loh states: 
[tlhere is a direct correlation between pre-existing 
social relationship and the use of force. A high 
'degree of force (including the use of a weapon) 
occurs in 28% of rapes by strangers, 17% by casual 
acquaintances, 14% by close acquaintances, and 3% 
by relatives. There is also a direct relationship 
between these two factors and the verbal resis-
tance of victims. In assaults by strangers, one-half 
of victims resist, but in assaults by close acquain-
tances or relatives, less than one-third resist. Simi-
larly, in rapes by strangers the physical injury rate 
(40%) is higher than in rapes by close acquaintances 
or relatives (23%). Greater social distance thus is 
associated with greater force, greater resistance, 
and greater physical injury. 
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The victims also respond to the assailant in a more subtle 
fashion than the violent rape myth would lead one to believe. 
Instead of physically resisting, several studies have found that 
the overwhelming response by victims is verbal: victims try to 
reason with the assailant, tell him no, make him feel guilty, 
cry, or tell him to stop.ao Other victims are unable to re-
spond because they experience a paralyzing fear. 141 Victims 
may also not resist to inhibit the assailant's use of violence, 
force, or aggression. 142 For whatever reason, not resisting is 
often the wiser choice since the risk of injury may increase 
with any kind of resistance. l43 Thus, rape victims are advised 
that "[ w ]hen confronted with attack, each woman must make a 
choice which is highly personal and may be affected by situa-
tional factors beyond her control."l44 The woman should 
"evaluate the threat she faces and decide how to react based on 
the kind of person she is."I45 
140. WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining that 84 percent of the 
acquaintance rape victims interviewed verbally resisted); State v. Rusk, 406 
A.2d 624, 629 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (dissenting judge stating that studies 
have shown that the most typical resistance given by victims is verbal 
resistance and that urban studies showed that only 12 percent of rape 
victims responded to the assailant with physical resistance); People v. 
Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118-119 (citing QUEEN'S BENCH FOUNDATION, RAPE PRE-
VENTION AND RESISTANCE 20 (1976)). The Queen's Bench study found that 70 
percent of the rape victims responded verbally. The range of resistance 
included adamant refusals to meek appeals. Examples of verbal responses 
included: appeals to conscience ("this isn't right" or "what if someone were 
doing this to your sister); attempts to make herself appear less desirable 
(saying she had a venereal disease or cancer); telling the assailant her 
"husband will be home soon," or stalling (saying "I have to go to the bath-
room first"). Schwartz, supra note 26, at 577 n.97. Interviews with acquain-
tance rape victims supports these findings. WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 32. 
As one rape victim related, "I started to cry. It was the only coping mech-
anism I had. I remember saying, "No, no, no," and crying profusely." 1d. An-
other rape victim explained her lack of physical resistance by stating that 
she "only wanted to come out alive." Tchen, supra note 23, at 1525 n.43. 
Another victim stated that she "didn't know how to" resist. 1d. at 1527 
n.49. 
141. People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118-19 (Cal. 1986); Amir, supra note 
134, at 52. Amir found that many rape victims do not resist the assailant 
in any manner. 1d. Amir based the study on 646 rape cases that were on 
file in the Philadelphia Police Department. 1d. at 43. 
142. Barnes, 721 P.2d at 119. 
143. 1d. The Queen's Bench study found that the victim's injuries "corre-
lated with some form of resistance, including verbal stalling, struggling 
and slapping." 1d. 
144. Barnes, 721 P.2d at 119. 
145. 1d. at 119-20. This advice reflects an understanding of how the 
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III. THE COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE "FORCE" 
ELEMENT IN ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CASES 
In keeping with the "violent stranger" rape myth, courts 
often require the assailant to use overt physical violence and 
the victim to resist to establish rape. l46 These de facto re-
quirements are manifested through the "force" element. 147 
The amorphous definition of "force"and "threat of force," which 
allows for broad application, is not the culprit.l48 Instead, the 
courts' tendency to narrowly apply the element results in ex-
cluding a broad range of coercive conduct from the "force" ru-
bric.149 If the victim tells the assailant to "stop," for example, 
crime occurs since research has shown that when a woman "is faced with a 
sexual attack and realizes her psychological and physical inability to 
protect herself, she is immobilized by fear, at least until she perceives 
and defines the situation, at which time it may be impossible to fight, flee 
or summon help successfully." Harris, supra note 15, at 626-27 n.75. 
146. See infra notes 156-214 and accompanying text. This section of the 
comment reviews acquaintance rape cases where the courts have reversed 
convictions due to insufficient force. While explaining the facts of each 
case, the word "rape" has been used to convey the perpetrated behavior. 
This section uses the word "rape" as it is commonly understood (sex with-
out consent) and not according to the courts narrow legal definition. 
This comment asserts that the legal definition of rape is inadequate and 
does not include situations that are properly characterized as "rape." 
147. Id. 
148. Estrich, supra note 58, at 1105. The Maryland Court of Appeal's 
definition of 'force' exemplifies this. The court stated: 
[f]orce is an essential element of the crime and to 
justify a conviction, the evidence must warrant a 
conclusion either that the victim resisted and her 
resistance was overcome by force or that she was 
prevented from resisting by threats to her safety. 
But no particular amount of force, either actual or 
constructive, is required to constitute rape. Neces-
sarily, that fact must depend upon the prevailing 
circumstances. As in this case force may exist with-
out violence. If the acts and threats of the defen-
dant were reasonably calculated to create in the 
mind of the victim having regard to the circum-
stances in which she was placed a real apprehension, 
due to fear, of imminent bodily harm, serious 
enough to impair or overcome her will to resist, 
then such acts and threats are the equivalent of 
force. 
State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 424 
A.2d 720, 726 (Md. 1981). 
149. See infra notes 156-214 and accompanying text. 
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and he continues, this is not legally regarded as "coercion" or 
"force." 150 Since research shows that many assailants use 
verbal coercion and victims verbally resist,151 this application 
of the "force" element necessarily impedes prosecution. 152 
There are two reasons courts may be unable to recognize 
coercion as "force." First, the law is applied from a male per-
spective.153 This is problematic because behavior the female 
150. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1348 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) 
(explaining that evidence of verbal resistance is only sufficient where 
coupled with a sufficient threat of forcible compulsion, mental coercion 
or actual physical force of a type inherently inconsistent with consensual sexual 
intercourse)(emphasis added). 
151. See supra notes 134-145 and accompanying text. 
152. The crime of robbery may illustrate the point. Robbery is the "felo-
nious and forcible taking from the person of another of goods or money 
to any value by violence or putting in fear." Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 
A.2d 738, 740 (Pa. 1984). To prove the force element, the state may show 
the force was either actual or constructive force (such as by threatening 
words or gestures). Id. at 741. The victim does not have to show overt 
physical violence occurred. Id. at 742. A "slight tug" on the arm to take 
the property will do. Id. If, however, the robbery victim had to suffer 
physical violence to satisfy the force element, some robbers would simply 
not be convicted. Commonwealth v. B!"own, 484 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1984) (finding 
sufficient evidence of 'force' to sustain robbery conviction where defen-
dant did not physically harm victim but grabbed her purse and ran away). 
153. Leslie Bender and Perette Lawrence, Symposium: Is the Law Male?, 
Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis and Property Managers' Liability for 
Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (stating that 
"[r]ecent feminist legal scholarship discloses how law is male both on its 
face and as applied"); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Feminism, Marxism, Method 
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 642-45 (1983) (ex-
plaining that "[t]he law sees and treats women the way men see and treat 
women."). It is predominantly male judges applying the law. Torrey, supra 
note 34, at 1055 n.208 ("According to the American Bar Association's Com-
mission on Women in the Profession, as of 1988 women comprised only 7.4% 
of federal, district, circuit, and U.S. Supreme Court judges. Women repre-
sented 7.2% of state court judges, but only 6.8% of judges on state 
courts of last resort and 6.5% of intermediate appellate judges. Women 
are very much under-represented considering they comprise 20% of the 
legal profeSSion."). The gender bias is also present in the practice of law. 
ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAw 52-53 (1988). The 1986 
New York State Task ForcelReport Women in the Courts found "consistent 
bias against women in New York in all aspects of litigation-as judges, law-
yers, clients, defendants, and jurors. Gender bias was defined from the 
outset by Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke as decisions made or "actions 
taken because of weight given to preconceived notions of sexual roles 
rather than upon a fair and unswayed appraisal of merit as to each person 
or situation." The study found that "cultural stereotypes of women's role in 
marriage and in society daily distort the courts' application of substantive law"; 
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victim finds "forceful," the court, applying a male perspective, 
does not. 1M Second, courts appear to condone the assailant's 
use of a certain amount of "coercion" by likening the conduct to 
"seduction.,,155 Thus, the typical behavior in an acquaintance 
rape scenario, with the assailant using verbal coercion and the 
victim verbally resisting, is characterized as legal consensual 
behavior. 
A. ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CONVICTIONS REVERSED DUE TO 
INSUFFICIENT "FORCE" 
Commonwealth v. Mlinarich 156 illustrates the tendency 
by courts to narrowly construe the element of "force," ignore 
the reality of the crime, and protect "seduction."157 In 
Mlinarich, the defendant and his wife agreed to assume custo-
dy of the 14-year-old victim after she had been sent to a juve-
women face "a judiciary uninformed about matters integral to many 
women's welfare." [d. (emphasis added). 
154. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
171-183 (1989); See also Kim L. Scheppele, The Reasonable Woman, LSA maga-
zine, Spring 1993. 
155. Fromm, supra note 2, at 593-594.; ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 69. 
Estrich, for example, states: 
. . . in a classic simple rape-where only one man is 
involved, even if he bears responsibility for inten-
tionally creating the situation that the woman 
finds threatening-the force standard continues to 
protect, as "seduction," conduct which should be 
considered criminal. It ensures broad male freedom 
to "seduce" women who feel themselves to be power-
less, vulnerable, and afraid. It effectively guaran-
tees men freedom to intimidate women and exploit 
their weakness and passivity, so long as they don't 
"fight" with them. And it makes clear that the re-
sponsibility and blame for such seductions should be 
placed squarely on the woman. 
[d. See People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup. Ct. 1975) affd, 390 N.Y.S.2d 
912 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (labeling 'rape' the "more overt, aggressive and outra-
geous behavior of some men toward women" while stating that "there are 
some patterns of... aggressive male sexual behavior toward females 
which do not deserve... extreme penalties," therefore, "[wlhere force is 
not employed to overcome reluctance, and where consent, however reluc-
tant initially, can be spelled out, this we label seduction, which society 
may condone, even as it disapproves;"). 
156. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
157. See notes 159-178 and accompanying text. 
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nile detention home. 158 Mter the victim lived with the defen-
dant for a short period, the defendant began threatening to 
send the girl back to the detention home unless she had sex 
with him.159 The defendant then threatened the child three 
separate times, finally raping her the third time despite her 
crying and pleading with him to stop.160 
The majority in Mlinarich concluded that the defendant's 
threat to send the victim back to the detention home if she 
refused penetration was not a "threat of force.,,161 Equating 
"force" with physical violence ,162 the majority stated that a 
"threat of force" should be confined to threats of physical injury 
and not include any threat since it would "create a veritable 
parade of threats, express and implied, in support of rape accu-
sations . .. " and "intolerable uncertainty."l63 Quoting one 
source, the court explained that "[t]o constitute rape, where 
there is no force used, the woman must have been unconscious, 
or unable fairly to comprehend the nature and consequence of 
the ·sexual act. If not, there is no distinction between rape, 
where the force used is constructive, and seduction."lM Thus, 
the court explained,"[t]o allow a conviction for rape where the 
alleged victim has deliberately chosen intercourse in preference 
to some other unpleasant sensation not amounting to physical 
injury or violence would be to trivialize the plight of the help-
less victim of a violent rape .'1165 
158. [d. at 396. 
159. [d. 
160. [d. 
161. [d. at 403. 
162. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 400. In its opinion, the court quoted the 
American Jurisprudence definition of 'force,' which "uses the tenns "force" 
and "violence" synonymously." [d. ; 65 Am.Jur. 2d Rape § 4 (1972). The court 
stated that, "[tlhe term "force" and its derivative, "forcible," when used to 
define the crime of rape, have historically been understood by the courts 
and legal scholars to mean physical force or violence." [d. at 400. 
163. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 402. 
164. [d. at 400 (quoting 65 Am.Jur. 2d Rape § 4 (1972); (emphasis added)). 
165. [d. at 402 (emphasis added). By this statement, the court is intimat-
ing that the rape victim who experiences violence beyond unwanted pene-
tration is the more worthy victim. How the court arrives at this conclu-
sion is unclear. Typically, survivors of both stranger and acquaintance 
rape may experience what is called 'posttraumatic stress disorder.' 
WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 68. For the acquaintance rape victim, however, 
the psychological effects often differ and may be more severe in certain 
aspects. [d. at 70. The acquaintance rape victim "may become afraid of be-
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Intimating that violent rape is the only "real" rape, the 
majority in Mlinarich excluded a broad range of coercive be-
havior from the "force" definition. 166 Coercion in sexual rela-
tions was not, however, merely excluded: it was normalized as 
an "unpleasant sensation."167 The assailant taking physically 
aggressive acts against the victim's body while she begged and 
pleaded was not illegal, because, according to the court, the 
child chose to have sex.168 The power imbalance, not only be-
tween the typical male and female, but also between a girl 
child and her male guardian, was ignored.169 If the guardian 
ing in crowds or of being alone . ., [s]he may become distrustful of even 
close friends... [t]hese fears are especially understandable given the 
unique nature of date rape and acquaintance rape. Both the woman's per-
sonal world and the world at large are now seen as threatening: There is 
nowhere that is safe, no one who may be trusted." [d. As opposed to 
stranger rape victims, "[a]cquaintance-rape victims may have an even more 
difficult time [with sex] due to the new loss of trust in men who are 
close to them." [d. at 73. When the acquaintance rape victim tells her 
male partner about the rape, many times the relationship ends due to 
doubts about the rape itself. [d. at 76. Unlike many stranger rapes, the 
acquaintance rape victim is also often blamed for the rape or not believed 
by close family members and friends. [d. at 77. 
166. [d. 
167. [d. 
168. [d. 
169. By applying the 'force' element in this narrow manner, the court 
ignores the fact that rape is typically a male against female crime, and 
thus, necessarily includes a power imbalance. Susan Brownmiller explains 
this unequal battle ground succinctly: 
Reality replaces myth with shocking swiftness. The 
female did not choose this battlefield, this method 
of warfare, this surprise contestant. Her position, 
at once, is unprepared and defensive. She cannot 
win; at best she can escape defeat. Force, or the 
threat of force, is the method used against her, and 
a show of force is the prime requisite of masculine 
behavior that she, as a woman, has been trained 
from childhood to adjure. She is unfit for the con-
test. Femininity has trained her to lose. According 
to the odds, she is three inches shorter and 24 
pounds lighter than her male assailant. This works 
to her disadvantage psychologically as well as phys-
ically, but worse than the difference in size is the 
lifelong difference in mental attitude toward 
strength. He has been encouraged from childhood 
to build his muscles and toughen his fists. She has 
been encouraged to value soft skin, her slender 
wrist, her smooth, unmuscled thigh and leg. 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 11, at 360. 
35
Edwards: Rape Law Reform
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
276 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:241 
had assaulted the victim in addition to the rape or had specifi-
cally threatened to commit an additional assault, only then 
would the force element have been satisfied.170 The assailant, 
then, is allowed to use all the means within his power to co-
erce sex, short of explicit violence, thereby illustrating that 
"acceptable sex, in the legal perspective, can entail a lot of 
force."m Thus, the majority defined rape in the most narrow 
of terms and excluded the vast numbers of rapes that are per-
petrated through verbal coercion. 
The dissent in Mlinarich, on the other hand, argued that 
the definition of "force" should include coercion that is both 
moral and intellectual, and should not be limited to violence or 
threats of violence.172 Concluding that the threat was suffi-
cient "force,,,173 the dissent emphasized the importance of the 
coercive atmosphere: the victim had been afraid; she had told 
the assailant to "stop;" she had screamed and cried throughout 
the assault.174 The dissent also stressed that, on previous oc-
casions, the guardian had: pushed the victim's head to his 
penis while she struggled, cried, and yelled at him to stop; 
yelled at her, called her names and told her that she would 
never see her father again unless she capitulated, and threat-
ened to send her away.175 
By emphasizing the coercive atmosphere, the dissent gave 
weight to the female victim's perspective and did not succumb 
to the violent rape myth. The dissent acknowledged that rape 
occurs in a variety of circumstances where the assailant may 
often subject the victim to the "power" and "weight" of his 
authority.176 The dissent argued that limiting the inquiry to 
whether the victim had been beaten, choked, or threatened 
with death, was contrary to rape law reform. 177 "Force," the 
dissent stated, should include the use of "strength, power, 
170. [d. 
171. MAcKINNON, supra note 154, at 173. 
172. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 407-08. 
173. [d. at 404. 
174. [d. at 405-06. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. at 408. 
177. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d at 412. 
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weight, stress, and duress,'m8 because rape "can be accom-
plished by compulsion arising from something less than vio-
lence or the threat of violence."179 
Other courts, however have adopted reasoning similar to 
the Mlinarich majority. In State v. Rusk180 and Goldberg v. 
State,181 for example, the courts were also unable to recognize 
the coercion typically used by assailants as "force." As in 
Mlinarich, the Rusk and Goldberg courts exhibited the tenden-
cy to recognize only a "traditional male notion of a fight" as 
sufficient "force," essentially defining "force" according to ''hoy's 
rules applied to a boy's fight,"182 - "the sort of punching, 
kicking, brawling violence that is required to get a convention-
ally socialized man to do something against his Will."l83 The 
gender bias is apparent, for in both cases, the court was unable 
to comprehend the factors that instill fear and terror in a wom-
an who is faced with a threatening man. Thus, unable to un-
derstand the subtle force that frightens a female victim, the 
courts in Rusk and Goldberg, like the Mlinarich court, defined 
the "force" element narrowly, excluding the vast majority of 
rapes that occur through verbal coercion. l84 
In State v. Rusk, the victim met the defendant in a bar 
and agreed to give him a ride home. 185 Mter refusing to go 
inside his home, the defendant forcibly took her car keys and 
told her to go inside.186 The victim testified that once she was 
inside the apartment, she "was still begging him to please . . . 
let me leave. I said, ''You can get a lot of other girls ... for 
178. Id. at 408. 
179. Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
180. State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 
424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). By similar reasoning, the author means that each 
of these courts has narrowly construed the "force" element and refused 
to look at the assault through the eyes of the female victim to see how 
a man's behavior could be threatening to a woman without the use of 
actual physical force. 
181. Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
182. ESTRICH, supra note 4, at 60, 62. 
183. Kim L. Scheppele, The Revision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 
1102 (1987) (reviewing SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE: How THE LEGAL SYSTEM VIC-
TIMIZES WOMEN WHO SAY No (1987». 
184. Fromm, supra note 2, at 594. 
185. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 626. 
186. Id. 
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what you want," and he just kept saying, "no"; and then I was 
really scared, because I can't describe . . . what was said. It 
was more the look in his eyes . . . ,,187 When the victim start-
ed to cry, the defendant began "lightly" choking her.188 She 
asked him if would let her go without killing her if she did 
what he wanted. 189 He replied affirmatively, and then raped 
her. 190 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed the con-
viction based on insufficient "force.,,191 Disregarding evidence 
that the defendant forcibly took her car keys, refused to let her 
leave, and said he would release her if she complied - the court 
stated that the only evidence of "force" was the "light choking" 
and the victim's testimony about the "look" in the defendant's 
eyes.192 The court concluded that the "threat of force" element 
was not satisfied because the victim's fear was "unreason-
able.,,193 
187. [d. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. 
190. Rusk, 406 A.2d at 626. 
191. [d. at 628 (concluding that the victim's fear was not reasonable). 
192. [d. 
193. [d. Professor Estrich has argued that, "[t]heir version of a reason-
able person is one who does not scare easily, one who does not feel vul-
nerability, one who is not passive, one who fights back, not cries. The 
reasonable woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy sissy; She is a real man." 
Estrich, supra note 58, at 1114. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals later reinstated this conviction. 
State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en bane), rev'd, 424 
A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). The court stated that a jury could conclude that the 
victim was raped based on all the evidence, particularly focusing on the 
"light choking." Thus, although the state prevailed, the court once again 
focused on actual physical force to justify its decision. The court did, 
however, display an ability to understand the plight of a frightened fe-
male. The court stated: 
[flrom [the victim's] testimony, the jury could have 
reasonably concluded that the taking of her car 
keys was intended by Rusk to immobilize her alone, 
late at night, in a neighborhood with which she was 
not familiar; that after Pat [the victim] had repeat-
edly refused to enter his apartment, Rusk command-
ed in firm tones that she do so; that Pat was badly 
frightened and feared that Rusk intended to rape 
her; that unable to think clearly and believing that 
she had no other choice in the circumstances, Pat 
entered Rusk's apartment; that once inside Pat asked 
38
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/2
1996] RAPE LAW REFORM 279 
In State v. Goldberg, the court concluded that the victim's 
fear was also unreasonable based on circumstances similar to 
Rusk. 194 In Goldberg, the 18-year-old victim went with the 
defendant to his "studio"195 because he told her he was an 
agent who could help her become a mode1.196 At the "studio," 
even though the victim told the defendant that she wanted to 
go home, "didn't want to do this," and "didn't want to be a 
model anymore,"197 the defendant pushed her on the bed, re-
moved her clothes and raped her.198 As he raped her, she 
"started crying real hard. ,,199 
Equating "force" with "violence," the Goldberg court held 
that the "force" element had not been satisfied because there 
was no evidence that the defendant was going to physically 
harm her.20o The victim's pleas to be left alone, and the 
defendant's physical actions overriding these pleas, were insuf-
ficient to establish "forceful" behavior.201 Again, the court dis-
played an inability to recognize that if the victim has said "no," 
and the perpetrator continues, the next physical action is in 
itself, coercive. The assailant knows the victim has refused, 
and thus his action can only be characterized as intentionally 
coercive and threatening. His actions, at this point, speak 
louder than words: by ignoring her "no," he is telling her she 
will participate. 
Both Rusk and Goldberg illustrate the courts' tendency to 
permISSlOn to leave but Rusk told her to stay; that 
he then pulled Pat by the arms to the bed and un-
dressed her; that Pat was afraid that Rusk would 
kill her unless she submitted; that she began to cry 
and Rusk then put his hands on her throat and 
began 'lightly to choke' her; that Pat asked him if 
he would let her go without killing her if she com-
plied with his demands; that Rusk gave an affirma-
tive response, after which she submitted. 
Rusk, 424 A.2d at 728. 
194. MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAw 416 (1992) 
(stating that the facts of Rusk and Goldberg seem very similar). 
195. Goldberg, 395 A.2d at 1214-15. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 1215-16. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 1216. 
200. Goldberg, 395 A.2d at 1219-20. 
201. Id. 
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require greater violence, beyond coercion, to satisfy the force 
element. In both decisions, the courts felt "there was not 
enough violence to take it beyond the category of "sex"; they 
were not coerced enough.,,202 If coercion is excluded, the typi-
cal verbal coercion used by perpetrators is then sanctioned and 
normalized. The female victim's most effective self-defense tool, 
her words, are taken from her. Being generally smaller than 
the attacker, the female victim's best weapon is often her abili-
ty to reason and verbally dissuade the attacker. By not giving 
sufficient weight to this evidence, the courts are effectively 
telling the victim that she must physically fight back - even 
though she will risk greater injury.203 If the victim does not 
physically assault her attacker, then the act may be labelled 
seduction, rather than rape. 
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz204 also illustrates the courts' 
tendency to exclude coercion. In Berkowitz, the court reversed 
the defendant's rape conviction stating that the victim's behav-
ior represented only "reluctant submission."205 In Berkowitz, 
the victim, who had been drinking alcohol, went to the 
defendant's dorm room to talk.206 Inside the dorm room, the 
202. CATHERINE MACKINNON, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw, at 88 (1987). MacKinnon argues that 
the "level of acceptable force is adjudicated starting just above the lev-
el set by what is seen as normal male sexual behavior, including a normal 
level of force, rather than at the victim's, the woman's, point of viola-
tion." MACKINNON, supra note 154, at 173. 
203. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text. 
204. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
205. Id. at 1342. Ironically, the defendant argued that the court should 
overturn his rape conviction and "define the parameters between what may 
have been unacceptable social conduct and the criminal conduct necessary 
to support the charge of forcible rape." Id. 
206. Id. at 1339. Like the victim in Berkowitz, many acquaintance rape 
victims have been drinking at the time of the assault and are "often less 
able to resist because their reflexes are impaired by drug or alcohol in-
toxication, making them easier targets." LEDRAY, supra note 1, at 21. In the 
1985 study involving 6,100 undergraduate men and women by Mary P. Koss, 
Ph.D., "75 percent of the men and at least 55 percent of the women in-
volved in acquaintance rapes had been drinking or taking drugs before 
the attack." WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 44. A 1986 study revealed that 75 
percent of the college men interviewed "reported using alcohol or drugs 
in an attempt to obtain sex from an unwilling woman: Sixty-six percent of 
the men had given a woman alcohol, and 42 percent had gotten a woman 
high on marijuana or pills in the belief that intoxication would make her 
more willing to have sex. Kramer, supra note 8, at 115, 122-23. In State v. 
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defendant moved on top of the victim, "kind-of pushed" her, 
and started kissing her.207 The victim asked the defendant to 
stop, told him she had to go, but he persisted.208 As she con-
tinued to say "no," he tried to put his penis in her mouth.209 
Then, the defendant got up, locked the door, "kind-of pushed" 
her on the bed, and raped her.210 
Finding insufficient "force," the Berkowitz court explained 
·that the victim had "walked freely into [his] dorm room in the 
middle of the afternoon," stayed there of her own volition, and 
had not physically resisted or screamed out.211 Scrutinizing 
the victim, the court stated that there was no reason the vic-
tim could not simply have left.212 Thus, although both the vic-
tim and defendant testified that she repeatedly said "no," the 
court stated that "evidence of verbal resistance [is] only suffi-
cient where coupled with a sufficient threat of forcible compul-
sion ... ,,213 If the victim had been struck,214 pinned 
down,215 or choked,216 then rape would have been estab-
Oltarsh, the victim was gang raped by several fraternity men who plied 
her with alcohol while one of the fraternity man raped her. Id. at 132-36 
(citing State v. Oltarsh, No. 88-2002-CF (Fla. Cir. Ct. Sentencing Proceed-
ings July 10, 1990)). The victim could not stand up on her own and was 
sliding down the wall she was propped up next to during the ordeal. Id. 
at 133. During the assault, the victim was also penetrated with a tooth-
paste tube and woke up to find 'slut,' 'whore,' and 'bitch' written on her 
thighs. Id. In State v. Draghi, Gabrinowitz & Grandinetti, one defendant 
repeatedly insisted that the victim drink, despite her refusals, eventually 
forcing the cup of alcohol to her lips. Id. at 136-41 (citing State v. 
Draghi, Gabrinowitz & Grandinetti, No. 23/25 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991)). The 
victim passed out, and intermittently regained consciousness to find the 
defendants raping and sodomizing her, one defendant banging his penis 
against her head. Id. at 137-38. Despite corroboration by one eyewitness 
who verified the victim's testimony, the defendants were acquitted. Id. at 
140. 
207. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339-40. 
208. Id. at 1340. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 1342, 1344. 
212. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1347. 
213. Id. at 1348 (emphasis added). 
214. Commonwealth v. Rough, 418 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding 
forcible rape where victim was forced to floor and struck). 
215. Commonwealth v. Meadows, 553 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (find-
ing forcible rape where victim was pinned to the ground). 
216. Commonwealth v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (finding 
forcible rape where the victim was choked and defendant placed hands 
41
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lished. Kind-of pushing the victim while she said "no," howev-
er, was simply not enough force. 217 
These decisions illustrate the courts' inability to recognize 
behavior that is coercive to a female victim as sufficient evi-
dence of "force.,,218 Some type of physical violence or an ex-
plicit threat of physical violence is often required to satisfy the 
"force" element.219 By defining "force" in this manner, the 
courts are subjecting the victim to greater danger and exclud-
ing the vast majority of rape cases that occur through verbal 
coercion.220 In a crime that typically involves male assailants 
and female victims, the definition of "force" should necessarily 
take the power imbalance between the sexes into account, 
rather than condone forced sex through coercion. 
B. ACQUAINTANCE RAPE CONVICTIONS REVERSED DUE TO 
INSUFFICIENT RESISTANCE 
The resistance requirement of the "force" element, re-
quired in many states,221 also forces the victim to behave in 
over her mouth to silence her screams). 
217. Other courts have displayed similar limitations in applying the 
'force' element. In Washington, for example, the court has found suffi-
cient force where the defendant grabbed the victim, pulled her hair, or 
covered her mouth to stop the screaming. State v. Ieremia and Singh, 899 
P.2d 16, 17-18 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (sufficient force where defendant Singh 
forced the victim to drink, grabbed her arm, and covered her mouth; suffi-
cient force where defendant Ieremia grabbed the victim's wrists, pulled 
her hair, and covered her mouth). In another case, however, the court 
held there was insufficient force where the defendant ordered a mental-
ly handicapped woman to lie down on the bed after she had refused. State 
v. Weisburg, 829 P.2d 252, 253-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
218. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); 
Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979); State v. Rusk, 
406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en bane), rev'd, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 
1981); Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
219. See infra notes 156-216 and accompanying text. 
220. See infra notes 131-145 and accompanying text. 
221. State v. O'Donnell, 433 S.E.2d 566, 568 (W.Va. 1993) (victim is re-
quired to show she responded with earnest resistance to satisfy the forc-
ible compulsion element); Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 720, 721 (Ala. 1991) 
(victim must show earnest resistance to satisfy forcible compulsion ele-
ment); State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Utah 1987) (victim must show 
earnest resistance); State v. Lima, 643 P.2d 536, 540 (Haw. 1982) (victim must 
show earnest resistance which must involve "a genuine physical effort" by 
victim); State v. Marlow, 888 S.W.2d 417, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (forcible 
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an atypical manner and subjects her to greater physical brutal-
ity.222 Studies have shown that the risk of injury increases 
with physical resistance and that most victims do not respond 
in this manner - out of fear, inability, or wisdom.223 Instead, 
many victims respond with verbal resistance,224 which fails to 
satisfy the resistance requirement.225 The law's requirement 
that the victim physically resist, then, fails to maintain an 
appropriate legal standard and ignores how the vast majority 
of rapes occur. 
Several cases illustrate that some courts require physical 
resistance even though victims typically resist verbally. In 
Commonwealth u. Berkowitz,226 for example, the court stated 
that the victim's repeated verbal pleas were insufficient resis-
tance.227 Although resistance was not required under Penn-
sylvania law, the court explained that the "'no resistance 
requirement' ... must have limits."228 The court stated that 
because the law required a "threat of forcible compulsion that 
would prevent resistance by a reasonable person,,,229 verbal 
pleas were insufficient.230 
In McQueen u. State,231 the court reversed the 
defendant's rape conviction based on insufficient "force" be-
cause the victim had offered only verbal resistance.232 In 
McQueen, the defendant drove his wife's sister, a 14-year-old 
girl, to a secluded spot, ordering her to disrobe and lie down, 
and then raped her.233 The victim refused to open her car 
compulsion requires physical force that overcomes reasonable resistance); 
People v. Dozier, 85 A.2d 846 (N.Y. 1981) (reasonable resistance required). 
222. People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 118-19 (Cal. 1986). 
223. 1d. 
224. WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 49; State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624, 634 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
225. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992); State v. Lima, 624 P.2d 1374 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981), reu'd., 643 P.2d 536 
(Haw. 1982); Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 720 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). 
226. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
227. 1d. at 1344-45. 
228. 1d. at 1347. 
229. 1d. at 1345. 
230. 1d. at 1344-55. 
231. McQueen v. State, 423 So. 2d 800 (Miss. 1982). 
232. 1d. at 800-01. 
233. 1d. at 801. The victim was visiting her sister, who was separated 
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door to the defendant, told him she was scared, said she want-
ed to go home, cried and told him that he was hurting her.234 
from the defendant, when the attack occurred. [d. at 800. The defendant 
had dropped by his wife's house to deliver furniture. [d. He then asked if 
he could take their 2 year old daughter to the store with him. [d. The 
wife, Elizabeth McQueen, didn't want the baby to be alone with the defen-
dant and so she asked her sister, the victim, to accompany him and the 
baby to the store. [d. After the defendant and the victim left the store, 
the victim testified that: 
[d. at 801. 
he [the assailant] said he was lost, and he brought 
me back on this road, and he said he had to use the 
bathroom, and he turned the truck around, and he 
turned the lights off, and I locked my side of the 
door, and he come around on my side and told me to 
get out, so I did. He told me to take off my 
clothes, but leave one leg on, and I was scared, and 
I told him that I wanted to go home. So he told me 
to go around on the other side and lay on the 
driver's seat side and lay half way. So I did, and he 
told me to put my legs up on his shoulders and I 
did, and I was crying, and he made the baby sit on 
the other side of the truck, on the passenger's side, 
and he told me that he wasn't going to hurt me, 
and it wasn't going to take long, and while we was 
doing it and that, he told that, I've got news for 
you, it's in, and I started crying and I told him that 
I wouldn't-that I didn't want to get pregnant, and 
he told me that he wasn't going to come inside me, 
and so after he was finished, he told me, he says 
not to say anything to Tootie (her sister) ... 
234. [d. at 801. In describing the 'force' the defendant used, the victim 
explained: "Well, the tone of his voice and that, for first of all. Okay, 
second of all, by not letting me get up when I wanted to, when I wanted 
to stop and just making me do something that went against my will." [d. at 
801-802. She also stated that she "was just scared of him because he was 
drinking and that, and I was scared he was going to hurt me." [d. at 801. 
The court, however, stated that the evidence 
not only fails to satisfy the mind of the guilt of 
the accused but suggests grave doubt of it. No 
bruises or marks of violence were evident except 
reddening of the vulva. No weapon was exhibited 
and the evidence falls far short of showing that 
the prosecutrix submitted because of a reasonable 
apprehension that she would suffer injury if she 
refused. Appellant did not threaten to injure prose-
cutrix, did not forcibly remove her from the truck, 
did not remove her clothes, and did not forcibly 
make her lie down in the truck. The evidence pre-
sented on behalf of the state is legally insufficient 
to support a conviction for the crime of forcible 
rape. 
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The court explained that because the defendant did not physi-
cally force the victim to comply and the victim failed to physi-
cally resist, the "force" element was not satisfied. In sharp 
contrast, the dissent argued that physical resistance should not 
be required. 235 In addition, the dissent explained that it "is 
lamentable but true that too many times cases have come 
before this Court showing that where a rape victim kicked, 
screamed, and physically fought to the bitter end-she became 
a victim of homicide following the rape.,,236 
Still, other cases show courts require physical resistance. 
In State v. Lima,237 the court reversed the defendant's rape 
conviction due to insufficient resistance because the 14-year-
old victim offered only verbal resistance.238 Though the defen-
dant had pinned the victim to the ground while he raped 
her,239 the court emphasized that the victim had not physical-
ly resisted. 
In Powe v. State,240 the court reversed the defendant's 
rape conviction on the grounds that the ll-year-old victim did 
not resist. 241 Although the victim testified that she was 
scared throughout the assault of the defendant, her father, the 
McQueen, 423 So. 2d at 803. 
235. [d. at 806-07. The dissent argued that it was 'reasonable' that a 13 
year old child "would be terrified of the older (double her age) and obvi-
ously physically superior male, and that his threatening conduct and ac-
tions in her mind were as real as if he had actually threatened to kill 
her with a deadly weapon." [d. at 806. The dissent explained that the de-
fendant "was a 28-year-old male and she was lJ2 his age. She knew that he 
had been drinking. Further she was afraid of him because of the follow-
ing: his tone of voice, his actions, and because of what he had done in the 
past . .. She was in a remote area where there were no people to hear 
her screams for help; she was afraid that he would hurt her; and al-
though she did cry, it was to no avail." [d. 
236. [d. 
237. State v. Lima, 624 P.2d 1374 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd., 643 P.2d 536 
(Haw. 1982). 
238. [d. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the conviction asserting 
that the victim did employ some physical resistance. The reasoning of the 
appellate court, however, shows that courts are struggling with the resis-
tance requirement and reluctant to find crying or verbal resistance as 
genuine resistance. 
239. Lima, 624 P.2d at 1375-1376. 
240. Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 720 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). 
241. [d. 
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court emphasized that the child did not offer any physical 
resistance and the defendant had not made an express 
threat.242 Oral protests alone, the court held, were insuffi-
cient.243 
These cases illustrate that courts continue to require resis-
tance, despite the fact victims rarely physically resist. AB with 
the courts' application of the "force" element, the reality of 
acquaintance rape is denied. When the victims offer verbal 
resistance the "force" element and resistance requirement will 
not be satisfied. When the victim offers verbal resistance, how-
ever, this puts the perpetrator on notice that his actions were 
unwanted. The victim should not be required to suffer greater 
harm to prove rape. Thus, the resistance requirement should 
be eliminated, both in practice and by law. 
IV. THE WASHINGTON THIRD DEGREE RAPE STATUTE 
Washington's third degree rape statute,244 which 
criminalizes nonconsensual intercourse without any showing of 
force, creates a legal standard that most accurately fits the 
reality of the crime.245 If available in other jurisdictions, this 
statute could increase acquaintance rape convictions without 
requiring the victim to suffer additional violence. The difficulty 
courts appear to have with finding sufficient force would also 
be circumvented. Thus, this statute maintains a legal standard 
that is both realistic and provides greater protection for the 
victim. 
242. Id. at 721. 
243. Id. 
244. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 1988). 
245. Searles, supra note 52, at 32. As of January 1986, only five states 
criminalized nonconsensual penetration-or rape without force. Id. The five 
states are Washington, Iowa, Mississippi, Nevada, and Vermont. Id. In the 
vast majority of states, then, rape without "force" is legal. Id. 
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A. WASHINGTON RAPE LAw REFORM: THIRD DEGREE RAPE 
STATUTE CREATED 
Before 1975, Washington's rape statute was typical of pre-
reform rape statutes in many other jurisdictions.246 Rape was 
defined as sexual intercourse with a person not the wife or 
husband of the perpetrator committed against the person's will 
and without the person's consent.247 Lack of consent was the 
primary element,246 and physical resistance was required.249 
In the 1970s, the Washington state legislature selected 
drafters to rewrite the state's criminal code.250 The first revi-
sions, written by two men picked by the Washington Legisla-
tive Council Judiciary Committee, primarily mirrored the Mod-
246. Loh, supra note 51, at 549. 
247. WASH. REV. CODE Ch. 154, § 122 Wash. Sess. Laws. (1st Ex. Sess.) 1198 
(repealed 1975) provided: 
Rape is an .act of sexual intercourse with a person 
not the wife or husband of the perpetrator commit-
ted against the person's will and without the 
person's consent. Every perpetrator of such an act 
of sexual intercourse with a person of the age of 
ten years or upwards not his wife or husband: 
(1) When, through idiocy, imbecility or any un-
soundness of mind, either temporal or permanent, 
the person is incapable of giving consent; or 
(2) When the person's resistance is forcibly over-
come; or 
(3) When the person's resistance is prevented by 
fear of immediate and great bodily harm which the 
person has reasonable cause to believe will be in-
flicted upon her or him; or 
(4) When the person's resistance is prevented by 
stupor or weakness of mind produced by an intoxi-
cating narcotic or anaesthetic agent administered by 
or with the privity of the defendant; or 
(5) When the person is at the time unconscious of 
the nature of the act, and this is known to the 
defendant; 
Shall be punishable by imprisonment in the state peniten-
tiary for not less than five years. 
Loh, supra note 51, at 548-49 n.21. 
248. Helen G. Tutt, Washington's Attempt to View Sexual Assault as More 
Than a "Violation" of the Moral Woman-The Revision of the Rape Laws, 11 GoNZ. 
L.R. 145, 155-56 (1975). 
249. Loh, supra note 51, at 549. 
250. [d. at 568. 
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el Penal Code revision.251 Like the Model Penal Code, the 
proposal had four different degrees based on culpable conduct, 
a corroboration requirement, and lacked a shield law for vic-
tims.252 
After the proposal was published, several dissatisfied 
groups,253 including the Seattle Women's Commission, draft-
ed counter-proposals.254 Ultimately, the proposal by the Seat-
tle Women's Commission prevailed and was enacted in full by 
the legislature one year later.255 
The rape statute drafted by the Seattle Women's Commis-
sion divided the crime into three degrees based on the amount 
of force used by the assailant.256 The first two degrees resem-
251. [d. The Washington state legislature assigned the duty to rewrite 
the state's criminal code to the Washington Legislative Council's Judiciary 
Committee in 1967. [d. The two men specifically assigned this duty were 
University of Washington Law Professor John Junker and his former stu-
dent, Richard Holmquist. Id. at n.136. The authors also used aspects of the 
pre-reform Michigan statute and the New York rape statute when creating 
the proposal. [d. at 568. 
252. Loh, supra note 51, at 568. Prior to this proposal, the Washington 
rape law did not have a corroboration requirement. Thus, the inclusion of 
a corroboration requirement was actually a step backwards, reversing 
"existing Washington case law." [d. 
It should be noted that Loh is only researcher who has documented 
the legislative history of rape law reform in Washington. Loh explained 
that because there was "no formal history of the legislative history and 
purposes of the Washington law" all the data from his article was derived 
from interviews with "state legislators, attorneys, and representatives of 
women's groups involved in the legislative reform process." [d. at 558 n.80. 
253. [d. at 568-569. Prosecutors objected to the different mens rea re-
quirement for the different degrees as unnecessarily complex and 
"women's groups were incensed at the evidentiary provisions of the rape 
section." [d. at 568. 
254. Loh, supra note 51, at 568-569. 
255. [d. at 569. 
256. The Washington rape statutes are as follows: 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040 (West 1988): Rape in the first degree: 
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when 
such a person engages in sexual intercourse with another 
person by forcible compulsion where the perpetrator or an 
accessory: 
(a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or 
what appears to be a deadly weapon; or 
(b) Kidnaps the victim; or 
(c) Inflicts serious physical injury; or 
(d) Feloniously enters into the building or vehicle 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss2/2
1996] RAPE LAW REFORM 289 
ble the Model Penal Code by eliminating nonconsent as an 
element and emphasizing "force" and "resistance."257 Like the 
Model Penal Code, both degrees also require the assailant to 
use "forcible compulsion" which overcomes or prevents resis-
where the victim is situated. 
(2) Rape in the first degree is a class A felony. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.050 (West Supp. 1995): Rape in the second 
degree: 
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when, 
under circumstances not constituting rape in the first 
degree, the person engages in sexual intercourse with 
another person: 
(a) By forcible compulsion; 
(b) When the victim is incapable of consent by 
reason of being physically helpless or mentally 
incapacitated; 
(c) When the victim is developmentally disabled and 
the perpetrator is a person who is not married to 
the victim and who has a supervisory authority 
over the victim; 
(d) When the perpetrator is a health care provider, 
the victim is a client or patient, and the sexual 
intercourse occurs during a treatment session, con-
sultation, interview, or examination. It is an affir-
mative defense that the defendant must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the client or 
patient consented to the sexual intercourse with the 
knowledge that the sexual intercourse was not for 
the purpose of treatment; or 
(e) When the victim is a resident of a facility for 
mentally disordered or chemically dependent persons 
and the perpetrator is a person who is not married 
to the victim and has supervisory authority over 
the victim. 
(2) Rape in the second degree is a class A felony. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 1988): Rape in the third degree: 
(1) A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when, 
under circumstances not constituting rape in the first or 
second degrees, such a person engages in sexual inter-
course with another person, not married to the perpetra-
tor: 
(a) Where the victim did not consent as defined in 
RCW 9A.44.010(6), to sexual intercourse with the 
perpetrator and such lack of consent was clearly ex-
pressed by the victim's words or conduct, or 
(b) Where there is threat of substantial unlawful 
harm to property rights of the victim. 
(2) Rape in the third degree is a class C felony. 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44 (West 1988). 
257. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040 (West 1988), 9A.44.050 (West Supp. 
1995); MODEL PENAL Code § 213.1. 
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tance.258 Since the first and second degrees require the state 
to prove the "force" element, both statutes could present prob-
lems for the acquaintance rape case where overt force is not 
used. 
To address this problem, a third degree rape statute259 
was specifically created for acquaintance rapes based on the 
understanding that "the use of force and subsequent resistance 
is reduced when the victim and assailant are acquainted."260 
Under the third degree statute, the "force" element and "resis-
tance" requirement were eliminated.261 In addition to pene-
tration, the state must instead prove only lack of consent 
"clearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct."262 
By eliminating the "force" element, Washington has ac-
knowledged the manner in which acquaintance rapes are gen-
erally perpetrated. Instead of requiring a push or a shove to 
prove rape, the court may instead circumvent the "force" prob-
lem and look only for nonconsent clearly conveyed. Under this 
standard, the victim is not required to endure greater physical 
brutality and the perpetrator is legally required to respond 
accordingly if the victim says "no.,,263 Since many victims re-
spond with verbal resistance, this statute, unlike the "forcible 
compulsion" statutes, has elements which can realistically be 
satisfied.264 
258. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.44.040 (West 1988), 9A.44.050 (West Supp. 
1995); MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1. The difference between Washington's first 
and second degree rape is that first degree also requires aggravating 
circumstances. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040 (West 1988). 
259. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 1988). 
260. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1535 n.103. 
261. [d. at 1536. 
262. [d. 
263. Some commentators have criticized this aspect of the- statute. 
Tchen, supra note 23, at 1535-36. One criticism is that the statute 
criminalizes conduct without requiring criminal intent. [d. at 1536. If the 
victim says 'no,' however, and the assailant continues to take action 
against her body, then criminal intent should be established. Disregarding 
the woman's plea to stop indicates that the assailant intends to rape - not 
have consensual sex with a willing partner. In addition, if the statute can 
be read to eliminate intent, this is not unusual since "most American 
courts have omitted mens rea altogether" from the elements the state 
must prove in rape cases. Estrich, supra note 58, at 1097. 
264. Critics of the statute have also argued that the victim should be 
required to physically resist to give the assailant adequate notice of 
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The addition of the third degree statute has also produced 
tangible benefits; rape convictions have increased 19 percent 
under the third degree statute.265 One study of the conviction 
rates before and after reform, however, suggests that the in-
crease in rape convictions is due to offenders not being con-
victed of lesser offenses.266 The study found that before rape 
law reform, "35% of initially filed rape cases were convicted of 
other sentences, "267 such as assault.268 After reform, "only 
15% of rape filings result in convictions of other offenses.,,269 
Thus, although the "total pool of offenders" has not increased, 
assailants previously convicted of assault and other lesser 
offenses are now convicted of rape.270 Also, "[dlefendants are 
more likely now to plea to rape or statutory rape than to an-
other charge, just as they are more likely to be convicted of the 
charged offense rather than of assault.,,271 The statute, there-
nonconsent. Tchen, supra note 23, at 1536. The statute, however, requires 
that the victim clearly communicate nonconsent by words or conduct, 
thus clearly giving notice to the perpetrator that she is unwilling. 
265. Loh, supra note 51, at 591. 
266. 1d. at 592-93. 
267. 1d. at 593. Loh states that, "[iJn support of the establishment of 
degrees of rape, it is often said that juries under the old law had to 
acquit rather than convict in instances of lesser culpability. This un-
doubtedly occurred in some cases. The more common result, as these data 
show, was to convict them of another lesser offense when that option 
was available." 1d. at 593 n.262. 
268. 1d. at 591. Loh states: 
This relabelling has occurred primarily in less ag-
gravated cases. Under the new law, the most suc-
cessful prosecutions are those filed under rape 1. 
Their conviction rate for rape is 66%. Of the 39 
cases in which forcible rape was charged under the 
old law, 21 (or 53%) were of an aggravated nature. 
These cases could have been filed as rape 1 had the 
new law been in effect; under the old law 61% of 
them resulted in rape convictions, approximately the 
same conviction rule as for rape 1 cases. Thus, pros-
ecutors have been highly successful in "hardcore" 
cases regardless of the substantive law. The more 
aggravated the circumstances, the less probable the 
inference of victim consent, and the more likely a 
conviction. 
1d. at 593 n.263. 
269. Loh, supra note 51, at 593. 
270. 1d. at 593, 618. Loh explains that "[iJncreasing rape convictions was 
one of the principal motivations of law reform advocates. This objective 
has been achieved." 1d. at 593. 
271. 1d. at 598. 
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fore, has had a significant impact. Rape offenders are now 
being convicted of rape, and not assault. 
The more accurate labelling of the offense is of enormous 
importance. First, a rape conviction establishes that the wrong 
being punished is not a simple assault. Instead, the crime 
being punished is one of the most humiliating, degrading, and 
life-altering experiences any victim may ever endure.272 As 
one commentator explains, rape "is considered criminal be-
cause of the outrage committed on the victim's personhood, and 
the infringement of the individual's freedom of choice. If the 
reason for punishment was mainly the physical violence in-
volved, the crime would simply be a species of assault.,,273 
Thus, under the third degree statute, the criminal behavior is 
not excused or downgraded as an assault, but is instead recog-
nized as one of the most traumatic invasions a victim may 
experience.274 
Second, the third degree statute shows society's acknowl-
edgment that this behavior is rape and not merely assault. The 
statute, then, reflects a studied understanding of how rape 
occurs and does not force the rape victim to suffer the further 
indignity of having the perpetrator's behavior trivialized.275 
In addition, by labelling nonconsensual intercourse rape, the 
272. LEDRAY, supra note 1, at 70. Ledray's book provides guidance to rape 
survivors. Ledray states: 
[d. 
For most of you, rape is the most serious life crisis 
you will have to face, with few exceptions. It is a 
time of overwhelming turmoil, confusion, and disor-
ganization. You may be concerned about the way you 
are feeling in response to the rape. You've probably 
never felt the extreme and conflicting emotions you 
do now-the fears, the rage, the panic attacks, or 
the worthlessness. You may even be afraid that you 
are "going crazy," or that you will never recover 
and be able to go on with life again. But you will. 
What you are experiencing is normal after a very 
serious life crisis. 
273. Loh, supra note 51, at 593 n.264. 
274. LEDRAY, supra note 1, at 70. 
275. [d. "To highlight the outrage involved, many women victims prefer 
to see their assailants convicted of third degree rape rather than first 
or second degree assault, even though the penalty for the rape offense is 
much lower." [d. 
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statute promotes a civilized understanding of how sex should 
occur between two willing partners. Thus, the "correct label" is 
not merely symbolic, but has tangible benefits for the rape 
victim and for society at large. 
B. THE COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE THIRD DEGREE RAPE 
STATUTE: STATE V. WEISBERG & STATE V. MCKNIGHT 
State v. Weisberg276 and State v. McKnight277 are ac-
quaintance rape cases which discussed application of the third 
degree rape statute. In both cases, the perpetrator did not 
inflict actual violence or explicitly threaten to inflict vio-
lence.278 Both victims, however, clearly conveyed 
nonconsent.279 In Weisberg, the presence of the third degree 
rape statute enabled the court to sustain the rape conviction 
without a showing of "force.,,28o In McKnight, although the 
"forcible compulsion" conviction was sustained, the court dis-
cussed application of the third degree rape statute.281 
1. State v. Weisberg: Convicted of Third Degree Rape 
In State v. Weisberg,282 a 54-year-old clothing salesman 
enticed his mentally retarded female neighbor to his apart-
ment by promising her a birthday gift.283 In the apartment, 
the defendant stated that the gift, which was clothing, was in 
the bedroom.284 In the bedroom, he told the victim that she 
should take off her underwear and bra to try on the clothes 
because they would fit better.285 When the victim didn't re-
spond, he took them off for her.286 Mter the victim put her 
clothes back on, the salesman told her to lie down on the 
276. State v. Weisberg, 829 P.2d 252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
277. State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
278. [d.; State v. Weisberg, 829 P.2d 252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
279. See supra notes 282-323 and accompanying text. 
280. Weisberg, 829 P.2d at 256. 
281. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 536-537. 
282. Weisberg, 829 P.2d 252. 
283. [d. at 253. 
284. [d. 
285. [d. 
286. [d. 
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bed.287 The victim told him that she didn't want to, but he 
told her to "go ahead and lay on the bed anyway.,,288 He then 
proceeded to rape her, immediately afterwards telling her not 
to "say anything to anybody [about] what I did.,,289 Based on 
the foregoing, the jury convicted the defendant of second de-
gree rape by forcible compulsion.290 
The Washington appellate court then reversed the 
defendant's second degree rape conviction because of insuffi-
cient "force.,,291 The court reasoned that there was no "force" 
because the defendant did not expressly threaten to injure the 
victim and the victim had not tried to escape.292 The 
defendant's command to lie down on the bed was also not im-
plied force. 293 Indicating that only an express threat of physi-
cal violence would suffice, the court stated that the defendant's 
"communications" did not indicate violence or "cause one to 
interpret 'lay down on the bed anyway' as a veiled threat of 
physical injury."294 
Although the second degree conviction was reversed, the 
court held that the defendant could be convicted under the 
third degree rape statute instead.295 Here, the state need only 
prove lack of consent, and not "force.,,296 The victim had clear-
ly conveyed her lack of consent by refusing to remove her 
clothes and refusing to lie down on the bed.297 When the de-
fendant told her to lie down on the bed anyway, he was aware 
that this conduct was against her will. The defendant's plea 
"not to tell anyone" also indicated knowledge that the victim 
had been unwilling and that he needed to hide his behav-
287. Weisberg, 829 P.2d at 253-254. 
288. [d. at 254. 
289. [d. 
290. [d. 
291. [d. at 255. 
292. Weisberg, 829 P.2d at 254. 
293. [d. at 255. The court, in fact, reduced the defendant's order to lie 
on the bed as merely a "disregard for [her] feelings." [d. 
294. [d. (emphasis added). 
295. [d. at 256. 
296. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.060 (West 1988). 
297. Weisberg, 829 P.2d at 253-254. The court did not explain how the 
victim had clearly conveyed lack of consent. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assert that the court drew on these factors since these two actions were 
the only clear responses taken by the victim. 
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ior.298 Thus, by not requiring "force," the court was able to 
convict the defendant of knowingly using verbal coercion, au-
thority, and manipulation to perpetrate rape. 
2. State v. McKnight: Struggling to find sufficient force 
In State v. McKnight,299 the court also dealt with an ac-
quaintance rape case where overt force and physical resistance 
were not present. In this case, however, the majority sustained 
the defendant's conviction of second degree rape by forcible 
compulsion.30o The dissent argued that the defendant should 
be convicted of third degree rape instead because the facts 
failed to establish the "force" element of second degree 
rape.301 Thus, although the conviction was upheld, this case 
shows that the tenuous method of determining "force" may 
lead to reversals in other jurisdictions where a third degree 
statute is unavailable. 
In McKnight, the 14-year-old victim was vaguely acquaint-
ed with the 17 -year-old defendant from riding the same school 
bus.302 The victim was walking to her health club when she 
ran into the defendant.303 At this point, the victim changed 
her mind about going to the health club and the two returned 
to the victim's apartment.304 Inside the victim's apartment, 
the victim and defendant began kissing.305 The victim testi-
fied that she told the defendant to "stop" kissing her, but he ig-
nored her plea and "started [to] slowly push [her] on the 
couch. ,,306 The defendant then started to pull on the victim's 
clothes and she told him to stop again.307 After the defendant 
removed her clothes, the defendant undid his pants and placed 
himself on top of her.308 As he penetrated her, the victim tes-
298. Id. at 254. 
299. State v. McKnight, 774 P.2d 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
300. Id. at 535-536. 
301. Id. at 537. 
302. Id. at 532. 
303. Id. 
304. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 532. 
305. Id. at 533. 
306. Id. at 533. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. 
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tified that she "told him it hurt and he still didn't stop.,,309 M-
ter the defendant left, the victim called her cousin and stated 
that "she had gotten raped.,,310 
The majority upheld the "forcible compulsion" conviction, 
stating that the defendant's act of "slowly pushing" the victim 
onto the bed was sufficient "force.,,311 The majority explained 
that the victim's lack of resistance was reasonable because she 
was scared, physically weak, naive, a virgin, and had never 
gone out on a date before.312 From her perspective, the court 
explained, to struggle... would have been a futile ges-
ture.,,313 Thus, even though the victim did not resist and was 
not expressly threatened, the court held that the "force" ele-
ment had been satisfied for second degree rape.314 
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the defendant 
should be convicted of third degree rape because the facts 
failed to establish the "force" element for second degree 
rape.315 The dissent stated that "force" was absent because 
the assailant did not inflict actual violence or threaten to in-
flict injury and the victim had not physically resisted.3l6 A 
finding of insufficient "force," however, did not mean that the 
victim was not raped.317 Instead, the dissent agreed that the 
victim had been raped - and had clearly expressed nonconsent 
by repeatedly saying "stop.,,3lS Thus, the dissent concluded 
309. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 533. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 535-536. 
312. Id. at 535. 
313. Id. at 535. 
314. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 536. 
315. Id. at 537. The dissent explained that "[t]he only evidence of "resis-
tance" is that [the victim] told the defendant to stop kissing her and to 
stop disrobing her. The only evidence of physical force "which overcomes 
resistance" is that McKnight slowly pushed [the victim] onto the couch 
and laid on top of her ... He never hit her or threatened to hit her." Id. (em-
phasis added). 
316. [d. at 537. 
317. Id. at 536. The dissent stated that the issue was "not whether she 
was raped. She was." Id. 
318. Id. at 537. The dissent argued that it was important to maintain the 
distinction between second degree rape, which requires "force," and third 
degree rape, which does not require "force." Ironically, the reason it was 
important to discern between these two degrees was "to avoid elevating 
relatively minor acts of sexual misconduct, " i.e., third degree rape, to a 
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that since there was insufficient evidence of "force" for the 
second degree conviction, the defendant should be convicted of 
third degree rape instead.319 
Although the defendant's second degree conviction was 
sustained, McKnight illustrates that the court's determination 
of whether "force" is present can often be tenuous and arbi-
trary. The majority's finding of sufficient "force" rested on the 
victim's naivete and sexual inexperience.32o The victim's vir-
ginity was an important factor, for there was no evidence indi-
cating that the victim was "physically weak" or mentally in-
competent.321 The dissent's reasoning, on the other hand, was 
more commonplace.322 This indicates that in other jurisdic-
tions where a third degree statute is unavailable, the 
McKnight conviction, as well as other rape cases where overt 
force is absent, could be subject to reversal. If a third degree 
rape statute is available, however, the courts have an alterna-
tive and may sustain the conviction based on nonconsent clear-
ly conveyed.323 
felony. [d. 
319. McKnight, 774 P.2d at 537. 
320. [d. at 534·535. The court stated: 
[d. 
C [the victim] testified that she had never been out 
on a date with a boy. The evidence showed that this 
was her first sexual intercourse. Her cousin charac-
terized her as naive and unsophisticated. Indeed, the 
investigating officer testified that when he inter-
viewed C at the scene, she told him, "I think I've 
been raped." A reasonable fact finder could infer 
from this evidence that C was sufficiently naive not 
to comprehend fully what was happening during the 
assault. A reasonable fact finder could conclude 
that a rape victim who is unsophisticated about sex-
ual matters and who has never been sexually active 
!night only offer resistance commensurate with her 
limited understanding of what was occurring. 
321. [d. at 537. 
322. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1992); State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en bane), rev'd, 
424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981); Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1979); Powe v. State, 597 So. 2d 720 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. 
Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Weisberg, 829 P.2d 
252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
323. See State v. Weisberg, 829 P.2d 252 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
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C. REVISITING BERKOWITZ, RUSK, GOLDBERG, LIMA & 
MCQUEEN: APPLICATION OF WASHINGTON'S THIRD DEGREE 
RAPE STATUTE 
If an offense such as Washington's third degree rape stat-
ute had been available in Maryland and Pennsylvania, the 
rape convictions in Berkowitz,324 Rusk,325 and Goldberg,326 
which were reversed due to insufficient "force," might have 
been sustained. In each case, the courts reversed the rape 
convictions based on insufficient "force" - despite the fact that 
each victim clearly communicated nonconsent.327 Thus, the 
presence of a third degree rape statute without the "force" 
element would have enabled the courts to sustain the convic-
tions. 
In Berkowitz, for example, both the victim and the defen-
dant testified that the victim repeatedly said "no.,,328 These 
"no's" clearly indicated nonconsent and thus, should have been 
sufficient under Washington's third degree rape. In Rusk, the 
victim's pleas to leave (while the defendant said "no") also 
clearly communicated her nonconsent.329 Again, her pleas 
should have been sufficient to sustain a conviction without 
evidence of violence. In Goldberg, the victim told the defendant 
that she did not want to have sex, wanted to go home, and did 
not want to be a model anymore.330 This also clearly conveyed 
her nonconsent and under Washington's third degree rape 
statute, should have been sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
Rape cases reversed due to insufficient resistance, such as 
Lima331 and McQueen,332 might also have been sustained if 
a third degree rape statute had been available. In Lima, for 
324. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). 
325. State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en banc), rev'd, 
424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981). 
326. Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
327. See supra notes 65-67. 
328. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348. 
329. State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624, 626 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
330. Goldberg, 395 A.2d at 1215-1216. 
331. State v. Lima, 624 P.2d 1374 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 643 P.2d 536 
(Haw. 1982). 
332. McQueen v. State, 423 So.2d 800 (Miss. 1982). 
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example, the victim's pleas to "stop" the assault should have 
been sufficient to sustain the conviction.333 In McQueen, the 
victim's refusal to open the car door to the defendant and her 
pleas to go home should have also been sufficient to enable 
conviction.334 
The foregoing cases illustrate that Washington's third 
degree rape statute could have broad implications. Rape con-
victions could be sustained without a showing of overt violence 
and the victim would not be required to suffer greater indigni-
ties to prove rape. The perpetrator's conduct would also not be 
dismissed under the guise of insufficient force. Instead, the 
perpetrator would be held accountable for his criminal behav-
ior, despite the absence of overt violence or an explicit threat of 
violence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts often apply the "force" element in a manner that 
requires the perpetrator to use actual violence or an explicit 
threat of violence. This observable force that courts tend to 
recognize, however, is not typically used in acquaintance rapes. 
The assailant's "force" is more akin to acts of duress and coer-
cion, and the victims typically respond with verbal resistance. 
Thus, the courts have maintained a legal standard for rape 
that is contrary to how the crime actually occurs, and how its 
victims respond. 
Washington's third degree rape statute, which does not 
require the "force" element to prove rape, more accurately fits 
the reality of the crime. The victim is not required to endure 
greater physical danger, and can instead convey lack of con-
sent through a medium within her means, i.e., verbally. Use of 
this statute in other jurisdictions could provide the courts with 
an alternative to conviction where overt "force" is absent. Use 
of this standard in other jurisdictions would also represent the 
333. Lima, 624 P.2d at 1375-1376. 
334. McQueen, 423 So.2d at 800-801. 
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criminal justice system's acknowledgment of what defines rape: 
It is the violation, not the violence, that is criminal. 
Daphne Edwards· 
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